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THE BURGER COURT AND THE MEDIA: 
A TEN-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 
PHILIP R. HIGDON* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In perhaps no area of the law have the first ten years of the 
Burger Court had a more profound impact than in the First 
Amendment's protection of the rights of journalists to gather and to 
publish the news. Some have interpreted the pattern of the Burger 
Court's decisions involving the media as a virtual declaration of war 
by the judiciary against the press. 1 Others have viewed the same 
decisions not as a restraint on press freedoms but as a thwarting of 
asserted press privileges. 2 However the trend may be character­
ized, the media have suffered repeated blows during the past de­
cade to what they, at least, perceive to be their constitutional 
rights and privileges. 
If war has not been declared, hostilities have at least broken 
out. They are not one-sided, and the media have at times reacted 
almost hysterically as various decisions have been announced. The 
enmity of the press toward the Court, however, is understandable 
in view of the numerous setbacks journalists' views of the First 
Amendment have undergone over the past ten years. 
Most significantly, the Court has consistently refused to recog­
nize any First Amendment right of the press to gather the news, 
* Member of the law firm of Brown & Bain, P.A., Phoenix, Arizona; Visiting As­
sistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, 1979. The 
author wishes to extend special thanks to Cindy Mason for countless hours of editing 
assistance. 
1. Kwitny, A Judicial War on the Press?, Wall St. J., Aug. 23,1978, at 12, col. 4. 
2. Commotion from the High Court?, The Quill, July-Aug. 1978, at 23, col. 1 
(quoting Professor Philip Kurland). 
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especially when the necessary information is in the hands of gov­
ernment officials, notwithstanding the press' constitutional respon­
sibility to inform the public of government activities. The Court 
has refused to provide any meaningful protection for the con­
fidentiality of news sources. It has exposed newsrooms to surprise 
searches by police. It has drastically cut back on the constitutional 
protections previously afforded the media in defamation cases. On 
the other side of the ledger, however, it has blocked government 
attempts to impose prior restraints on publication and to require 
the publication of certain matter. 
This article examines the Burger Court's most significant deci­
sions in five areas relating to the gathering and disseminating of 
news. 3 The analysis is principally critical. Some criticism is di­
rected toward the Court for creating confusion through several 
vague and imprecise decisions. Most dissatisfaction, however, de­
rives from the Court's frequent failure to understand or to acknowl­
edge the constitutional role of the press and the special privileges 
required by the press to fulfill that role. 
The implications which follow from the Burger Court's first 
ten years of media law are disturbing, at least to those who believe 
that the framers of the Constitution intended the freedom of the 
press clause to create a special place for the media in the constitu­
tional scheme. This article focuses on the future implications of the 
Burger Court's media decisions. 
II. THE RIGHT OF THE PRESS 

TO PUBLISH WHAT IT KNOWS 

Whatever alarm the attitudes and decisions of the Burger 
Court may have caused the media in other areas, the Court has at 
least shown considerable reluctance to abridge the right of the 
press to be free of prior governmental restraints on publication. 
3. Three other important areas relating to the media, although treated by the 
Burger Court in significant decisions, will not be discussed. These are: (1) the rela­
tionship between the First Amendment and commercial speech (see Virginia State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n 
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)); (2) government regulation of broadcasting 
(see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 
440 U.S. 689 (1979); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 
412 U.S. 94 (1973)); and (3) obscenity and pornography (see Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Ward v. Illinois, 
431 U.S. 767 (1977); and Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978)). 
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This reluctance, of course, is but a part of a tradition predating 
even the First Amendment. In the eighteenth century, with de­
bate raging over the extent to which freedom of the press should 
be recognized, even those who argued that "improper, mischie­
vous, or illegal" publications could be punished after the fact, ac­
knowledged the impropriety of prior restraint on such publica­
tions. 4 
The subsequent debate over the scope of press freedoms has 
principally concerned the government's power to censure matter 
when published, not its power to restrain prior to publication. 5 
While the Supreme Court has recognized that protection against 
even prior restraints is not absolute, 6 it has narrowed the field of 
permissible restraints to exceptional cases7 and has insisted that 
courts subject governmental prior restraints on speech to the 
closest scrutiny.8 Thus, any system of prior restraint of expression 
comes before the Court with a heavy presumption against its con­
stitutional validity.9 The restraint must be phrased in the narrowest 
terms and cannot be upheld if reasonable but less restrictive 
alternatives are available;l0 and the activity restrained must pose a 
clear and present danger,l1 or a serious or imminent threat to a 
protected competing interest. 12 
4. 5 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 151-52 (Tucker ed. 1803). 
5. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714-15 (1931). 
6. Government imposition of prior restraints is permissible when speech threat­
ens to obstruct military recruiting, reveal sailing dates of transports, or the number 
and location of troops. "Decency" may require restraint of obscene publications. In­
citement to violence, and the overthrow of the government may likewise be sup­
pressed. Id. at 716 (footnote omitted). See also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 
52 (1919) (some speech may lose constitutional protection during time of war if it 
hinders the war effort). 
7. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
8. See CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1975). 
9. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (held state censorship 
scheme, although limited to informal sanctions, unconstitutional). 
10. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968) 
(held restraining order, banning rallies tending to disturb and endanger citizens dur­
ing a period of racial turmoil unconstitutional). 
11. To present a clear and present danger, the substantive evil of speech must 
be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Wood v. Georgia, 
370 U.S. 375, 384 (1962) (held contempt citation imposed for statement criticizing ju­
dicial actions unconstitutional) (quoting Eridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 
(1941)). . 
12. The threat must be imminent, not merely likely, and the danger must cre­
ate immediate peril, not be remote or even probable. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 
376 (1947) (reversed journalist's conviction under contempt of court charge for pub­
lishing criticisms of judicial handling of pending action). 
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The first prior restraint case to reach the Burger Court was 
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,13 in which Chief Justice 
Burger recognized that the party seeking to sustain a prior restraint 
must bear a heavy burden of justification. 14 A real estate broker 
had obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting a community or­
ganization from distributing literature of any kind anywhere in the 
City of Westchester, Illinois. The broker argued that the organiza­
tion's leaflets, critical of the broker's alleged "blockbusting" and 
"panic peddling"15 activities in a neighboring community, were not 
entitled to First Amendment protection because they invaded his 
right of privacy and were coercive and intimidating, rather than in­
formative. 16 
The Court17 vacated the injunction because the heavy pre­
sumption against the constitutional validity of any prior restraint on 
publication had not been overcome. 18 Near v. Minnesota 19 held 
that prior restraints of publications concerning the malfeasance of 
public officers violate the First Amendment. Similarly, the Keefe 
Court could find no authority supporting the use of a court's 
injunctive power to protect an individual from public criticism of 
his business practices. 2o Against this backdrop, several more signif­
icant prior restraint cases were decided by the Burger Court. 
A. "Gag" Orders in Criminal Proceedings 
In Sheppard v. Maxwell,21 the Warren Court reversed a mur­
der conviction on the ground that the defendant had not been 
given a fair trial. This conclusion had two bases. First, the trial 
judge had permitted the case to be tried in a "carnival atmos­
phere, "22 with newsmen hounding participants and disrupting the 
trial by their movement in and out of the courtroom. 23 Second, the 
record convinced the Court that the deluge of publicity emanating 
13. 402 U.S. 415 (1971). 
14. ld. at 419. 
15. Respondent's activities allegedly were intended to arouse fear in local 
white residents that Blacks planned to move into the area, causing the white resi­
dents to sell their property and allowing the real estate broker to seC1,lre listings. [d. 
at 416. 
16. Id. at 418. 
17. Justice Harlan dissented on procedural grounds. [d. at 420-23. 
18. [d. at 419. 
19. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
20. 402 U.S. at 419. 
21. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
22. [d. at 358. 
23. Id. at 355. 
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from the proceedings had reached at least some members of the 
jury.24 The Court was particularly concerned because these news 
accounts included charges about the defendant not raised in the 
trial, journalists' interpretations of the evidence and a "doctored" 
front-page photograph. 25 
The Court severely criticized the trial judge's failure to main­
tain control of the publicity of the trial. It specifically suggested 
that the trial court should have insulated the witnesses from press 
accounts of other witnesses' testimony and other witnesses' out-of­
court statements. Moreover, some effort should have been made 
"to control the release of leads, information, and gossip to the 
press by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel for both 
sides. "26 Citing the right of the accused to a trial by an impartial 
jury free from outside influences, the Court suggested additional 
measures to curb the impact of publicity on the jury, including 
continuing the case until the threat of prejudice abated or 
transferring the case to another county not so inundated with pub­
licity.27 Missing from the Court's lengthy list of judicial powers to 
nullify prejudicial publicity was perhaps the most expeditious 
method, direct restraints on what might be published. The Court 
specifically stated that nothing proscribed the press from reporting 
events that transpired in the courtroom. 28 
That possibility was raised six years later in Branzburg v. 
Hayes,29 a case not involving prejudicial publicity, where the 
Burger Court suggested in dictum the validity of gag orders in 
criminal proceedings to protect the rights of the accused. Journal­
ists, the Court said, could be prevented from "attending or pub­
lishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to 
assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. "30 
The result was swift, undeniable and, perhaps, predictable: 
24. ld. at 357. 
25. ld. 
26. ld. at 359. 
27. ld. at 361-63. In addition, the judge should have raised sequestration of the 
jury sua sponte with counsel. 
28. ld. at 362-63. 
29. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
30. ld. at 685 (emphasis added). The Burger Court's subsequent treatment of 
the power of the courts to bar the attendance of journalists at criminal proceedings 
will be discussed below in connection with Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 
2898 (1979). As will further be discussed below, this was not the only troublesome 
dictum to come out of the Branzburg opinion. See notes 179-206 infra and accompa­
nying text. 
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courts allover the country began issuing gag orders. From 1967 
through 1973 twelve such orders were reported. There were 
thirteen in 1974 alone, fourteen in 1975 and eleven in the first six 
months of 1976.31 One such order, which had been imposed in a 
Nebraska murder case, was challenged in Nebraska Press Associa­
tion v. Stuart. 32 The Supreme Court agreed to review this decision 
which concerned the prosecution of Erwin Charles Simants for the 
murder of six members of a family in Sutherland, Nebraska, on the 
night of October 18, 1975. The crime had attracted widespread 
news coverage by local, regional, and national newspapers and by 
radio and television stations. 33 The day before Simants' preliminary 
hearing, and three days after the crime, the prosecutor and 
Simants' attorney joined in asking the county court to enter an or­
der restricting what could be disclosed by the press to the public 
about the case. Following oral argument on the request, in which 
no representative of the press participated through counsel, the 
county court issued an order prohibiting everyone in attendance 
from releasing any testimony given at the preliminary hearing. 34 
The preliminary hearing was opened to the public and the press, 
but subject to the order. 
Several representatives of the media went to state district 
court, where Simants was to be tried, asking that the county court 
order be vacated. The district court instead issued a restrictive or­
der of its own, applicable only until the jury was impaneled, specif­
ically prohibiting the press from reporting on five specific sub­
jects35 and from reporting the exact nature of the order itself. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court was asked to vacate the district 
court's order. In an attempt to accommodate Simants' right to a fair 
trial and the media's interest in reporting pretrial events, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court modified the county court's ruling and 
limited the scope of the gag to three matters.36 It refused, how­
31. Friendly, Murder in Nebraska, Dateline 4, 9 (1977). 
32. 194 Neb. 783,236 N.W.2d 794 (1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
33. 427 U.S. at 542. 
34. Id. 
35. The five subjects were: (1) Simants' confession to law enforcement officers; 
(2) Simants' statements to other persons; (3) the contents of a note he had written the 
night of the crime; (4) medical testimony at the preliminary hearing; (5) the identity 
of the victims of Simants' sexual assault. Id. at 543-44. 
36. The three matters subject to the gag order were: (1) any confessions or ad­
missions made by the defendant to law enforcement officers; (2) any confessions or 
admissions made to any third parties, except members of the press; and (3) other 
facts "strongly implicative" of the accused. 427 U.S. at 545. 
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ever, to adopt an "absolutist position" that would bar a gag of any 
kind. 37 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari38 to con­
sider the important issues raised by the district court order as 
modified by the Nebraska Supreme Court, but it refused to expe­
dite review or to stay the orders entirely, pending Simants' trial. 
In the interim between the granting of certiorari and the Supreme 
Court's decision, Simants was convicted of murder and sentenced 
to death. 39 
The decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court was reversed, 
the Justices unanimously holding that the prior restraints imposed 
by the Nebraska order had not been justified constitutionally. The 
point of departure for the Justices was whether prior restraints 
could ever be justified in this context. 
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in which Justices 
Stewart and Marshall joined, recognized that while the right to a 
fair trial by a jury of one's peers is one of the most precious and sa­
cred safeguards within the Bill of Rights, prior restraints on free­
dom of the press are a constitutionally impermissible means of 
enforcing that right. Rather, alternative, less intrusive techniques 
exist to guarantee the accused a fair trial. 40 Because Justice 
Brennan believed the trial courts possess adequate tools other than 
injunctions against reporting to assure Sixth Amendment rights, he 
rejected the notion that there is an inherent conflict between free 
speech and the right to a fair trial, and that to uphold one right re­
quires the exclusion of the other. 41 Justice Brennan also cited prac­
tical reasons for not permitting prior restraints in this context. 
First, the potential for .subjective judicial censorship would exist 
and would be exacerbated by the fact that judges might, in some 
cases, be required to rule on whether material regarding their own 
competence, integrity, or general performance on the bench 
should be published. 42 In addition, there would be procedural dif­
37. 194 Neb. at 797,236 N.W.2d at 804. 
38. 423 U.S. 1027 (1975). 
39. 427 U.S. at 546. The Court nevertheless concluded that the controversy was 
not moot because the dispute was" 'capable of repetition.' .. Id. 
40. Id. at 572-73 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
41. Id. at 612. Among the tools listed by Justice Brennan were: (1) Sequestra­
tion of jurors and control over the courtroom and conduct of the trial; (2) the 
stemming of much of the flow of prejudicial publicity at its source, before it is ob­
tained by the press; (3) voir dire probing fully into the effect of publicity on prospec­
tive jurors; (4) a brief continuance of the trial to attenuate the impact of publicity; 
and (5) the granting of a change of venue if necessary. Id. at 601. 
42. Id. at 607. 
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ficulties associated with any attempt to impose prior restraints on 
publication of information relating to pending criminal proceed­
ings,43 and an inevitable overuse of the technique44 that would 
lead to profuse litigation substantially burdening the media. The fi­
nancial disincentives of such litigation, Justice Brennan argued, 
would deter the media from seeking relief and would create the 
distinct possibility that many erroneous impositions would go un­
corrected. 45 
In a separate concurring opinion,46 Justice White expressed 
doubt that restraints on the press such as were entered in this case 
would ever be justifiable, but agreed that it may have been pru­
dent not to announce such a rule in the first case in which the is­
sue was squarely presented to the Court. According to Justice 
White, a general rule should issue only after the courts have re­
ceived broader exposure to prior restraint cases and have reached 
similar recurring results. 
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, subscribed to Just­
ice Brennan's approach and announced that he would probably 
reach the same conclusion as Justice Brennan when squarely faced 
with a prior restraint case. 47 That conclusion, he said, could not be 
reached without considering whether absolute protection would ap­
ply if the information sought to be published was obtained in a 
shabby or illegal manner or by intrusion on privacy, or was false, 
prejudicial, or published with a perverse motive. 48 Adoption of 
Justice Brennan's view by Justice Stevens, then, would require fur­
ther argument on the issue of absolute protection. 49 
In any event, a majority of the Justices either announced in 
Stuart a willingness to adopt an absolute prohibition of prior re­
straints on publication of information about criminal proceedings or 
left that possibility open for consideration in a subsequent case. 
The remaining Justices, however, believed that such prior re­
straints could be permissible, if only in certain limited circum­
stances. 
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, declared his view 
that a prior restraint may issue only when it is necessary to prevent 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 6U. 
46. Id. at 570-71 (White, J., concurring). 
47. See text accompanying notes 40-45 supra. 
48. Id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
49. Id. 
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the dissemination of prejudicial publicity that is likely to interfere 
with the impaneling of a jury meeting the Sixth Amendment re­
quirement of impartiality. 50 
The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, also re­
jected Justice Brennan's absolutist approach. The ChiefJustice reit­
erated the Court's position that First Amendment rights are not 
absolute and went on to say that a showing of substantial threat to 
fair trial rights could justify restraint. 51 For the plurality, then, it 
was necessary to review the record that led to the Nebraska Su­
preme Court's gag order to determine whether the prior restraint 
was justifiably imposed. In so doing, the plurality remarked that 
"the barriers to prior restraint remain high, "52 describing such re­
straint as an extraordinary remedy in our jurisprudence. 53 The plu­
rality based its conclusion that the Nebraska Supreme Court's or­
der was constitutionally invalid on a number of considerations. 
First, although the plurality was persuaded that the Simants 
case would receive intense and pervasive pretrial publicity which 
the trial court could reasonably conclude would impair the defen­
dant's right to a fair trial, such a conclusion was at best speculative, 
being founded on factors unknown and unknowable. 54 
Second, the plurality noted that there was no finding that 
alternative measures would have inadequately protected Simants' 
rights. The Nebraska Supreme Court did no more than imply that 
other less intrusive measures might have failed to protect Simants' 
rights. 55 For specific alternatives that could have been considered, 
the plurality cited Sheppard. 56 , 
Third, the plurality believed that the orders of the Nebraska 
courts would be inefficacious in view of the attention the Simants 
case received nationally and the territorial limitations on the 
Nebraska courts' jurisdiction. There also existed the problem of 
trying to determine in advance what information would be prejudi­
cial. Information that was not restricted because it did not appear 
to be potentially prejudicial to the defendant could emerge through 
50. This requires a showing that "(i) there is a clear threat to the fairness of 
trial, (ii) such a threat is posed by the actual publicity to be restrained, and (iii) no 
less restrictive alternatives are available." ld. at 571-72 (Powell, J., concurring). 
51. Id. at 569-70. 
52. ld. at 570. 
53. Id. at 562. 
54. ld. at 563. 
55. Id. at 565. 
56. 384 U.S. 333, 361-62 (1966). See notes 26 & 27 supra and accompanying 
text. 
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publication and be damaging. 57 Illustratively, each of the three 
Nebraska courts had developed a different list of subject matter 
that would be prejudicial to Simants' rights. The plurality also cited 
the anomaly of permitting a small community's rumor mills to func­
tion unabated while shutting down reasonably accurate news ac­
counts. 58 
In addition, to the extent that the gag orders prohibited the 
reporting of evidence adduced at the open preliminary hearing, 
they violated the settled principle that nothing can prevent the 
press from reporting on events that transpire in the courtroom. 59 
Once a public hearing has been held, the events that took place 
there cannot be subjected to prior restraint. 60 Finally, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court's order, to the extent it prohibited publi­
cation of "implicative" information, was found by the plurality to 
be too vague and too broad to survive the close scrutiny the Court 
gives restraints on First Amendment rights. 61 
Despite the unanimity of the Court's decision in Stuart, gen­
eralizations about the case are hard to make, and guidelines for the 
future are not easy to develop since five Justices filed separate 
opinions and no more than three Justices subscribed to anyone of 
them. For example, while only four Justices rejected the "absolu­
tist" approach for all time, they did so vehemently. Furthermore, 
it is quite possible to imagine a case involving "shabby" and "ille­
gal" means of obtaining information, serious intrusions of privacy 
and so forth, that might cause Justice Stevens to abandon his an­
nounced inclination toward an "absolutist" approach. 62 
Even the lack of dissent from the view that the press may not 
be restrained from publishing what comes out in public criminal 
proceedings63 opened up another can of worms. The plurality in 
57. 427 U.S. at 567. 
58. Id. 
59. ld. at 568 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 362-63). 
60. 427 U.S. at 568. 
61. ld. 
62. See note 49 supra and accompanying text. 
63. IiI a similar case, the Supreme Court first stayed and then summarily re­
versed in an order by a state court judge in a juvenile proceeding that the press not 
publish the name of an eleven year old boy accused of homicide. Oklahoma Pub­
lishing Co. v. District Court, 429 U.S. 967 (1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). The 
boy's identity had been disclosed earlier during an open hearing and the Court held 
that the First Amendment "will not permit a state court to prohibit the publication of 
widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings which were in fact 
open to the public." 430 U.S. at 310. That the trial court judge had not expressly or­
dered the hearing to be public made no difference because the presiding judge, the 
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Stuart referred without comment to the statement by the Nebraska 
Supreme Court that, under Nebraska law, the preliminary hearing 
could have been closed to the public, including the press. A major­
ity of the Justices have since held that nothing in the First Amend­
ment prevents such closure,64 a decision that has been interpreted 
in some state courts as applicable not only to preliminary hearings 
but also to criminal trials. 65 The vexing problem of media access to 
information not produced in the courtroom also remains, and it, 
too, will be discussed below. 
In any event, Stuart indicates that the Burger Court means 
what it says about the barriers to prior restraint remaining high. 
Nothing in the various opinions indicates that they soon will be 
lowered by this Court. For that, at least, the press may be grate­
ful. 
B. Statutes Requiring Confidentiality of Proceedings 
In each of the last two terms, the Burger Court has reviewed 
state statutes making it a crime for members of the press to divulge 
to the public information about certain proceedings. On each occa­
sion, the Court has found the statute constitutionally improper. 
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia 66 involved a 
Virginia statute creating the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission67 to investigate charges of judicial improprieties. Pur­
suant to a state constitutional provision which required the creation 
of such a commission and which required the confidentiality of pro­
ceedings before the commission,68 the statute provided that all 
"papers filed with and proceedings before the Commission ... 
including the identification of the subject judge as well as all testi­
mony and other evidence" given to the Commission was not to be 
divulged "by any person to anyone except the Commission" until 
the filing of a formal, complaint with the Virginia Supreme 
Court. 69 Moreover, it was a misdemeanor for any person to divulge 
information in violation of the statute. 70 
prosecutor, and the defense counsel all knew that members of the press were in fact 
present and no objection was raised. [d. at 31l. 
64. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979). For a discussion of 
Gannett see notes 179-206 infra and accompanying text. 
65. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 5 MED. L. RPTR. 1545 
(Va.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 204 (1979). 
66. 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
67. Hereinafter referred to as the Commission. 
68. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 10. 
69. VA. CODE §§ 2.1-37.13 (1973). 
70. [d. 
604 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:593 
Notwithstanding these prohibitions, the Virginia Pilot, a news­
paper owned by Landmark Communications, published an article 
accurately reporting on a pending inquiry by the Commission and 
identifying the judge being investigated. The newspaper was prose­
cuted under the confidentiality statute, found guilty, and fined five 
hundred dollars. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the convic­
tion and fine, holding that premature disclosure of the Commis­
sion's sensitive proceedings posed a clear and present danger to 
the state's legitimate interests in the effective discharge of the 
Commission's purpose and to the orderly administration of just­
ice. 71 
The Burger Court, reversing, noted that forty-seven states, 
the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico had all established some 
type of judicial inquiry and disciplinary procedures, and that only 
Puerto Rico did not provide for the confidentiality of judicial disci­
plinary proceedings in some way. The Court willingly accepted 
"the collective judgment that confidentiality promotes the effective­
ness of this mode of scrutinizing judicial conduct and integrity," 
but considered this "only the beginning of the inquiry."72 The is­
sue, as the Court saw it, was not the validity of a confidentiality re­
quirement, but rather, whether the divulging or publishing of in­
formation concerning the work of the Commission by third parties, 
including the media, could be criminally punishable. 73 
The Court unanimously held74 that the media could not be 
criminally punished for divulging information about the Commis­
sion's work. While willing to assume that confidentiality of the 
Commission's proceedings served legitimate state interests, it 
71. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 217 Va. 699, 233 S.E.2d 120 
(1977). The Virginia court identified three functions served by the requirement of 
confidentiality in the commission's proceedings: (1) Protection of the j~dge's reputa­
tion from the adverse publicity that might flow from frivolous complaints; (2) mainte­
nance of confidence in the judicial system by preventing the premature disclosure of 
a complaint before the commission had determined that the charge was well­
founded; and (3) protection of complainants and witnesses from possible recrimina­
tion by prohibiting disclosure until the validity of the complaint had been ascer­
tained. Id. at 712, 233 S.E.2d at 128-29. 
72. 435 U.S. at 836. 
73. Indeed, while the "collective judgment" favored confidentiality provisions, 
only Hawaii, in addition to Virginia, provided criminal sanctions for disclosure. Id. at 
836-37. 
74. Neither Justice Brennan nor Justice Powell participated in the decision. 
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion was that, while Virginia could not extend its law 
to punish the media, it was not constitutionally prohibited from punishing other 
third parties who violated the confidentiality provisions. Id. at 849. The implications 
of driving this wedge between free press and free speech were not discussed. 
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found nothing in the record beyond assertion and conjecture to 
support the contention that without criminal sanctions these inter­
ests would be undermined. The majority questioned the relevance 
of the clear and present danger standard to the case and rejected 
what it termed a mechanical application of the standard by the 
Virginia Supreme Court amounting to nothing more than deference 
to legislation. 75 
The thrust of the majority's opinion was that the Virginia Pilot 
newspaper article, in providing accurate factual information about 
the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission's investigation, had 
served the First Amendment's aim of promoting discussion of gov­
ernmental affairs76 while the State of Virginia had failed to justify 
its attempted encroachment on that constitutionally protected ac­
tivity. 
While Landmark Communications has been hailed by the me­
dia as one of its few victories in the Burger Court in recent days,77 
the decision is not without disturbing features for the press. For 
example, Landmark Communications urged that "truthful reporting 
about public officials in connection with their public duties is al­
ways insulated from the imposition of criminal sanctions by the 
First Amendment. "78 One might have thought that this was almost 
a black letter law proposition, especially since Landmark Commu­
nications was able to cite, in its support, cases according constitu­
tional protection to untruthful speech about public officials79 and to 
the dissemination of truthful commercial information. 8o But the 
Court treated the proposal as if it represented some startling new 
jump that should not be taken precipitously: "We find it unneces­
sary to adopt this categorical approach to resolve the issue before 
us. "81 It can only be /hoped that we never find out in what circum­
stances criminal sanctions can be imposed for truthful reporting 
about public officials in connection with their public duties. 
The majority also concurred with the Virginia Supreme Court 
that the statute before it did "not constitute a prior restraint or at­
tempt by the State to censor the news media."82 No one ques­
75. ld. at 842-43. 
76. ld. at 839. 
77. See, e.g., Press hoping for improved court record, Publisher's Auxiliary, 
Nov. 13, 1978, at 1, col. 1. 
78. 435 U.S. at 838. 
79. See, .e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
80. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
81. 435 U.S. at 838. 
82. ld. 
606 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:593 
tioned in Stuart that an order by a judge not to publish certain in­
formation, enforced with the threat of jail for contempt of court, is 
a prior restraint and attempt to censor. Somehow, however, legis­
lative directives with similar provisions and enforcement mecha­
nisms are not viewed as prior restraints or attempts at censorship, 
though they produce, at least as a practical matter, the same re­
sult. 83 But if different standards are to be used to determine the 
validity of prior restraints and subsequent punishments, a point not 
addressed in Landmark Communications, the distinction is not 
without a difference. Unfortunately, when the Court had the op­
portunity a year later to recognize that court injunctions and prohi­
bition statutes operate with the same prior restraint effect and 
should, therefore, be treated alike, it declined to do so. 
That opportunity came when the Supreme Court reviewed an­
other statute intended to prevent the publication of information 
relating to judicial proceedings. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing 
CO.84 involved a West Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor for 
the name of a juvenile connected with juvenile proceedings to "be 
published in any newspaper without a written order of the court 
. . . . "85 Two newspapers were indicted under the statute after 
publishing the name of a juvenile allegedly responsible for killing a 
fellow junior high school student on the school grounds. The news­
papers had obtained the alleged assailant's name from various 
witnesses, the police and an assistant prosecuting attorney who 
were at the school. 86 The Charleston Daily Mail elected to omit 
the name in its first story on the incident because of the statutory 
prohibition; but the Charleston Daily Gazette, having made a dif­
ferent editorial decision, identified the juvenile the following morn­
ing. By that afternoon, at least three radio stations had carried the 
juvenile's name on various broadcasts; and the Daily Mail, 
believing that the information had by then become public knowl­
edge, published the name in its follow-up story on the killing. 
Following their indictments for violating the statute, the two 
newspapers sought and obtained from the state supreme court an 
order prohibiting county officials from taking any action on the in­
dictments. The West Virginia Supreme Court held that the statute 
operated as a prior restraint on speech and that the state's interest 
in protecting the identity of the juvenile offender did not overcome 
83. See note 129 infra. 
84. 99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979). 
85. W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1976). 
86. 99 S. Ct. at 2669. 
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the heavy presumption against the constitutionality of such prior 
restraints. 87 
When the case reached the Burger Court on certiorari, the 
newspapers first asked for a ruling that the West Virginia statute, 
while not a typical prior restraint, that is, a prior injunction against 
publication, nonetheless acted in "operation and effect" as another 
form of prior restraint. 88 The Burger Court, however, declined the 
invitation, preferring instead to retain the distinction between prior 
restraints and statutes attempting to punish publication after the 
event. 89 Thus, the "operation and effect" argument was not given 
its deserved recognition, and the Court continued to give the im­
pression that prohibition statutes are to be judged less harshly than 
judicial injunctions although the practical effect, as witnessed by 
the Charleston Daily Mail's initial editorial decision not to publish 
the juvenile's name, is the same. 
The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to declare the West 
Virginia statute a prior restraint because, even under the appar­
ently lesser standards by which prohibition statutes are now 
judged,90 it could be stricken as deficient. West Virginia's interest 
in protecting the anonymity of a juvenile offender to further his re­
habilitation was found in sufficient to warrant punishment of news­
papers for publishing truthful information about a matter of public 
significance. 91 Moreover, even assuming the statute served a note­
87. State ex rei. Daily Mail Publishing Co. v. Smith, 248 S.E.2d 269 (w. Va. 
1978), aff'd sub nom. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979). 
88. 99 S. Ct. at 2670. The newspapers, perhaps recognizing the politics of the 
situation, argued that the statute constituted a prior restraint only because of the 
need to apply to the judge for permission to publish the name. They were obviously 
stretching matters in an effort to make the prohibition more judicial than legislative, 
and thus more like a "classic" prior restraint. A more direct approach would have 
been a frontal assault on the judicial-legislative distinction. 
89. Id. Prior restraints are accorded the most exacting scrutiny while punish­
ment after publication must be merely necessary to further a state interest. 
90. In fairness, Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion does state that a crimi­
nal prohibition statute "requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its valid­
ity." Id. This does not, however, dispel the clear impression that such statutes are 
judged by a different, and lesser, standard than prior restraints by judicial injunction. 
91. In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied upon Davis v. Alaska, 415 
U.S. 308 (1974), in which similar interests were advanced by the state to justify pro­
hibiting criminal defendants from impeaching prosecution witnesses on the basis of 
their juvenile records. Id. at 2671. It was declared that the state's policy must be 
subordinated to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Finding the 
First Amendment right of publication to be of equal weight to the Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right, Chief Justice Burger concluded that the state's interest in juve­
nile offender anonymity must give way here as well. Id. (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 
U.S. at 319). 
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worthy state interest, it did not accomplish its stated purpose be­
cause it prohibited only newspaper dissemination. Broadcasters 
could, and did, publish the information with impunity.92 Finally, 
the majority noted that, while all fifty states provide in some way 
for confidentiality in judicial proceedings, only five imposed crimi­
nal penalties on nonparties for identifying juveniles, indicating that 
most states have found alternative means of accomplishing the ob­
jective of protecting juveniles identities. 93 
In addition to refusing to recognize the West Virginia statute 
as a prior restraint, the majority opinion gave the media occasion 
for pause by going out of its way to explain how narrow its holding 
was: 
There is no issue before us of unlawful press access to con­
fidential judicial proceedings . . . ; there is no issue here of pri­
vacy or prejudicial pretrial publicity. At issue is simply the 
power of a state to punish the truthful publication of an alleged 
juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. 
The asserted state interest cannot justify the statute's imposition 
of criminal sanctions on' this type of publication. 94 
C. Injunctions in the Name of "National Security" 
While the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the 
barriers to prior restraints are high,95 it has with equal consistency 
recognized at least certain categories of publications where the bar­
riers may be overcome upon a proper showing of justification. For 
example, the requirement of "decency" may be enforced96 by pre­
92. 99 S. Ct. at 2672. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result because he 
agreed that the West Virginia statute, by permitting the names of juvenile offenders 
to be broadcast, did not accomplish its purpose. He disagreed, however, with the 
majority's conclusion that protecting juveniles in this type of case was not an interest 
of the "highest order." He argued that such an interest "far outweighs any minimal 
interference with freedom of the press ...." Id. at 2673 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
93. ld. at 2672 (citing Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 
(1978)). Justice Rehnquist was not impressed: 
Even if the juvenile court's proceedings and records are closed to the pub­
lic, the press still will be able to obtain the child's name in the same man­
ner as it was acquired in this case. Thus, the Court's reference to effective 
alternatives for accomplishing the State's goals is a mere chimera. The fact 
that other States do not punish publication of the names of juvenile offend­
ers, while relevant, certainly is not determinative of the requirements of the 
Constitution. 
Id. at 2674 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citation to record omitted). 
94. ld. at 2672. 
95. See notes 6-12 supra and accompanying text. 
96. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 716. 
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venting, as well as by punishing, the publication of "the lewd and 
obscene, [and] the profane ... ,"97 and community security may 
be protected by restraining incitements to acts of violence and the 
overthrow by force of orderly government. 98 The rationale for the 
special treatment of these narrowly limited classes of speech in 
prior restraint analysis traditionally has been that lewd, obscene, 
profane and inciteful types of speech are of only slight social value, 
are not essential to the exposition of ideas, and are clearly out­
weighed by society's interest in order and morality. 99 
For very different reasons, the Court has also left the door 
open to the possibility of prior restraints in times of war. Certain 
speech tolerated during times of peace may be of such hindrance 
to a war effort that it loses its constitutional protection during times 
of war. 100 Thus, the government may prevent obstruction of its re­
cruiting service and the publication of the sailing dates of trans­
ports or the number and location of troops. 101 The Court's unstated 
purpose in recognizing this special class of speech was promotion of 
national security. The questions of how much restraint "national se­
curity" could justify, and of how directly speech must relate to a 
war effort for it to trigger a governmental right to prevent its publi­
cation were largely of academic interest until 1971. 
Legal scholars may differ as to whether the United States was 
"at war" in 1971 because no formal declaration of war against North 
Vietnam had been made by Congress; and politicians may disagree 
as to whether the Vietnam conflict really involved matters of na­
tional security, but American troops were certainly fighting and dy­
ing in Southeast Asia. The Nixon Administration was convinced 
that publication by The New York Times, the Washington Post and 
others of Daniel Ellsberg's "Pentagon Papers" would endanger its 
"war" effort and would be otherwise detrimental to "national secu­
rity." For that reason, the United States Government, apparently 
for the first time, sought to enjoin newspapers from publishing in­
formation in their possession. 102 
97. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
98. 283 U.S. at 716. 
99. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). The class of 
"libelous" speech was also included among those less protected in the Chaplinsky 
formulation under the same rationale. Id. It has since been held that even some li­
belous statements are entitled to full, if not absolute, constitutional protection. See 
notes 356-82 infra and accompanying text. 
100. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
101. 283 U.S. at 716. 
102. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725 (1971) (Brennan, 
J., concurring). 
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The case, New Yark Times Co. v. United States, 103 did not fit 
neatly into previous Court dicta. Publication of the "Pentagon Pa­
pers" did not involve direct obstruction of recruitment or revela­
tion of numbers or locations of troops. The majority viewed publi­
cation as courageous reporting which served the First Amendment 
purpose of revealing the workings of government. 104 The counter­
balancing fear, expressed by Justice Blackmun in dissent, was that 
publication ofthe "Pentagon Papers" might also result in" 'the death of 
soldiers, the destruction of alliances, the greatly increased difficulty 
of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to 
negotiate' [and the] prolongation of the war and of further delay in 
the freeing of United States prisoners .... "105 
Whether such results might, in another case, be sufficient to 
warrant a prior restraint was not decided. Six Justices voted to dis­
miss the government's complaint, but they could only agree to a 
brief per curiam opinion that the government had not met its 
heavy burden of showing justification for prior restraint in this 
case. All nine Justices filed separate opinions; combining them to 
form generalizations or to find guidance in future cases yields few 
meaningful results. 
Justices Black and Douglas maintained their absolutist posi­
tions, arguing that the First Amendment permits no prior re­
straints in any circumstances. lOS Justice Brennan would not go that 
far, but believed that the Near and Schenck v. United States 107 
dicta covered the field of what may be properly enjoined: "[O]nly 
governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, 
directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred 
to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support 
even the issuance of an interim restraining order. "108 Because the 
103. Id. at 713. 
104. Id. at 717. 
105. Id. at 763 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
106. "[Ilt is unfortunate that some of my Brethren are apparently willing to 
hold that the publication of news may sometimes be enjoined. Such a holding would 
make a shambles of the First Amendment." Id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring). Justice 
Black would not recognize an exception even for "national security." Id. at 719. 
Justice Douglas expressed the similar view that the First Amendment "leaves 
... no room for governmental restraint on the press." Id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concur­
ring). He viewed Near as a direct repudiation of the "expansive" view that the gov­
ernment has the inherent power to go into court and obtain an injunction to protect 
the national interest. Id. at 723. He considered the dominant purpose of the First 
Amendment to be the prohibition of the government's widespread practice of sup­
pression of embarrassing information. Id. at 723-24. 
107. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
108. Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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government had failed at every step to make out such a case, Just­
ice Brennan believed that each restraint that had been issued 
violated the First Amendment, even if its purpose had been to af­
ford the courts an opportunity to examine the claim more thor­
oughly.I09 
Justice Stewart expressed the view that the President alone 
should determine which internal security measures are necessary 
to maintain effectiveness in executing the Executive's power to 
conduct foreign affairs and to maintain a national defense. Though 
Justice Stewart announced that he was convinced that the Execu­
tive was correct with respect to some of the documents involved, 
he nevertheless joined with the majority because he could not say 
that disclosure of any of the documents would surely result in di­
rect, immediate, and irreparable damage to the nation or its peo­
ple. 110 
Justice White was confident that revelation of the documents 
would do substantial damage to public interests, but voted against 
the injunctions sought· by the government because it had not 
satisfied the very heavy burden that it must meet to warrant an in­
junction against publication. He would not, however, proscribe in­
junctions against publishing information about government plans or 
operations in all circumstances. 111 Justice White then noted provi­
sions of the Criminal Code that he believed were relevan t to this 
case. The sections he discussed make it a crime to publish certain 
photographs or drawings of military installations,112 proscribe pub­
lication of certain classmed information,113 and prohibit the willful 
communication of documents relating to the national defense to 
one not entitled to receive them. 114 Should the "Pentagon Papers" 
be published and any materials within the book violate these statu­
tory prohibitions, Justice White suggested that he would sustain 
the publisher's conviction under the Criminal Code even though a 
prior restraint could not justifiably be imposed on the writings. 115 
The final Justice to vote with the majority, Justice Marshall, 
came to his decision from yet another direction. Feeling compelled 
109. Id. at 727. 
110. Id. at 729-30 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
111. Id. at 731 (White, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
112. 18 U.S.C. § 797 (1976). 
113. Id. § 798(a). 
114. Id. § 793(e). 
115. 403 U.S. at 735, 736-37 (White, J., concurring). Justice Douglas' concurring 
opinion analyzed the same statutory provisions and found no relevance therein to 
these publications. Id. at 720-22. 
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to uphold the concept of separation of powers, he refused to pre­
vent behavior which Congress had specifically declined to pro­
hibit. 116 Justice Marshall also believed that the government had 
failed to establish that the criminal statutes referred to by Justice 
White did not provide an adequate remedy at law so as to require 
equitable relief. 117 
The dissenters' reasons for their votes were also varied. Chief 
Justice Burger simply announced that the "unseemly haste" with 
which the cases were conducted left him unprepared to reach the 
merits.118 The Chief Justice said he generally agreed with the 
views of the other dissenters, but the only solid clue to his ulti­
mate position was his rejection of the view of the "First Amend­
ment as an absolute in all circumstances."119 While Justice Black 
had argued that "every moment's continuance of the injunctions 
against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and 
continuing violation of the First Amendment,"120 Chief Justice 
Burger argued that the newspapers could not complain of any addi­
tional delay of publication that full adjudication might necessitate 
since the newspapers themselves had delayed publication for 
months after receiving the documents. 121 
The Chief Justice also chided the newspapers for failing to 
perform their basic duty as citizens with respect to the discovery or 
possession of stolen property or secret government documents, 
namely, "to give the government an opportunity to review the en­
tire collection" and to determine whether agreement could be 
reached on publication. 122 The Chief Justice announced that he 
would have ordered a stay of publication until the trial courts had 
had the opportunity to make a full determination of the merits. 123 
Justice Harlan also complained of the haste in the proceed­
ings, but felt nevertheless forced to reach the merits of the case. 
His dissent was based upon a belief in a limited scope of judicial 
review in cases of this sort and a general deference to the Execu­
116. Id. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
117. Id. at 743-44. 
118. Id. at 748, 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "The prompt settling of these 
cases reflects our universal abhorrence of prior restraint. But prompt judicial action 
does not mean unjudicial haste." Id. at 749. 
119. Id. at 748, 752. 
120. Id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring). 
121. Id. at 750 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
122. Id. at 750, 751. 
123. Id. at 752. He added his "general agreement" to Justice White's views on 
the potential applicability of the penal statutes. Id. 
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tive in determining matters of national security. The courts, he 
said, may not properly go beyond two specific inquiries: First, 
whether the subject matter of the dispute lay within the President's 
foreign relations power; and second, whether the head of the Exec­
utive Department concerned personally determined that disclosure 
of the subject matter would irreparably impair the national secu­
rity.124 Justice Harlan would have continued the restraints on pub­
lication pending "further hearings in each case conducted under 
the appropriate ground rules. "125 
Finally, Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Harlan's analysis 
and embraced much of what Justice White had said concerning 
possible criminal liability after the fact of publication. 126 He added 
his concern for the possible results of publication127 and stated 
that, if such results should come about, "then the Nation's people 
will know where the responsibility for these sad consequences 
rests. "128 
The ultimate result was that the Times, the Post and others 
eventually published the "Pentagon Papers," but the Court's wide 
diversity of opinions left little guidance for the future. Only two 
Justices, Black and Douglas, expressed the view that the First 
Amendment absolutely prohibits prior restraints in this area, and 
they no longer sit on the Court. Except for Justice Harlan's scope 
of review approach, none of the remaining Justices provided much 
in the way of guidelines for determining the validity of attempted 
prior restraints in national security cases. 
Five Justices discussed the criminal sanctions against 
communicating certain information but could not agree on the im­
plications of those statutes for this case. Justice Douglas believed 
that the criminal statutes indicated no intention by Congress that 
publication of documents relating to national security be either en­
joined or punished. Justices White and Marshall believed that the 
statutes could lead to punishment after the fact of publication. Just­
ice Marshall, however, felt that Congress' decision that certain 
communications could be punished without providing for pre­
publication injunctions ended any question of prior restraint. Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, however, saw no barriers to 
prior restraint imposed by the statutes and viewed the punish­
124. Id. at 757 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
125. Id. at 758-59. 
126. Id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
127. See text accompanying note 105 supra. 
128. 403 U.S. at 763 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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ments provided therein simply as additional inducements not to 
publish. None of the Justices discussing the penal statutes ap­
peared to have any problem with their First Amendment implica­
tions. 129 
An opportunity for further refinement of the law of prior re­
straints based upon national security claims has been aborted. On 
March 26, 1979, district court Judge Robert W. Warren issued, at 
the request of the government, an injunction prohibiting the maga­
zine The Progressive from publishing an article, The H-Bomb Se­
cret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It.130 The Judge con­
cluded that the article, while probably not providing a 
"do-it-yourself" guide for making a hydrogen bomb, could assist a 
medium-sized nation in developing such a weapon more quickly.131 
While The Progressive argued that all the data contained in the ar­
ticle was in the public domain and readily available to any diligent 
seeker, Judge Warren was convinced that the article set forth con­
cepts vital to the operation of the hydrogen bomb which were not 
available to the general public. 132 
The district court distinguished the "Pentagon Papers" cases 
on three grounds: First, the Pentagon cases dealt with purely his­
torical data; second, the government in the "Pentagon Papers" 
cases had advanced no cogent reasons as to what effect the article 
had on the national security interest, except that publication might 
cause the United States some embarrassment; and third, the most 
vital difference, the hydrogen bomb case involved a specific stat­
ute133 prohibiting publication of the material in question. 134 
Judge Warren viewed his task as one of weighing the merits 
and consequences of the two divergent views before him, injunc­
tion or publication: "A mistake in ruling against The Progressive 
will seriously infringe on cherished First Amendment rights. . . . 
A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the 
way for thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that event, our 
right to life is extinguished and the right to publish becomes 
moot. "135 The district court imposed an injunction based on the 
129. It has been argued, for example, that "Times-style injunctions may induce 
less self-censorship than criminal sanctions." Kalven, The Supreme Court, 1970 
Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 209 (1971). 
130. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
131. Id. at 993. 
132. Id. 
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2274(b) (1976). 
134. 467 F. Supp. 990, 994 (WD. Wis. 1979). 
135. Id. at 996. 
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following findings: The hydrogen bomb article was sufficiently anal­
ogous to the publication of troop movements in 1931 to warrant a 
prior restraint under the Near dicta; the government had met its 
heavy burden of justification for such a restraint; and restraining 
publication of the objectionable technical portions of the article 
would not impede the development of public knowledge or the na­
tional debate on national policy questions. 136 
The Supreme Court refused to expedite The Progressive's ap­
peal137 and never had the opportunity to review the district court's 
injunction or to refine the law of prior restraints in the national se­
.. curity area through this case. In September 1979, before the court 
6fappeals ruled on The Progressive's appeal, the Justice Depart­
ment dropped the case after material from The Progressive article 
was published elsewhere, despite the government's efforts to block 
publication. 138 
III. THE PRESS' RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
If the Burger Court has been reasonably solicitous of the right 
of the media to publish what it knows, it has been downright nig­
gardly in recognizing any right of the press to find out anything. It 
suggested in dicta that news gathering qualified for First Amend­
ment protection and that some protection for seeking out the news 
was crucial to upholding freedom of the press. 139 But the position 
of the Burger Court, as applied in practice, has been closer to that 
first independently expressed by Justice Stewart. Justice Stewart 
maintained that the constitutional guarantee of a free press created 
a fourth institution outside the government which provided an ad­
ditional check on the three official branches. 140 He explained that, 
although the autonomous press may publish what it knows and may 
136. Judge Warren acknowledged that his decision constituted "the first in­
stance of prior restraint against a publication in this fashion in the history of this 
country, to this Court's knowledge." Id. 
137. Morland v. Sprecher, 99 S. Ct. 3086 (1979). The denial was principally 
based on The Progressive's own delay before asking for expedition. Id. at 3087. 
138. U.S. Drops Its Effort To Stop Publication Of H-Bomb Article, Wall St. J., 
Sept. 18, 1979, at 10, col. 3. 
139. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 681. 
140. Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975). Professor 
Vincent Blasi has described this function of the First Amendment as the "checking 
value" and has concluded that "one of the most important values attributed to a free 
press by eighteenth century political thinkers was that of checking the inherent tend­
ency of government officials to abuse the power entrusted to them." Blasi, The 
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 
521, 538 (1977). 
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seek to learn what it can, the press does not have a constitutional 
right of access to all government information. "The Constitution it­
self is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets 
Act."141 
To what extent, then, does news gathering qualify for First 
Amendment protection? The Supreme Court strove to answer that 
question in a series of cases in the mid-1970's. The principal con­
clusion to be drawn from those decisions is that the Branzburg 
dicta carried little, if any, weight in deciding specific cases and 
probably is by now only a curiosity. 
A. Access to Government Institutions and Persons Within Them 
In Pell v. Procunier142 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 143 
the Burger Court clearly stated that the media have no greater 
right of access to government facilities than does the general pub­
lic. Both cases involved regulations by penal institutions banning 
press interviews with inmates. 144 
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Pell, said that the 
California regulations were intended to conceal prison conditions or 
to frustrate the press' investigation and reporting of those condi­
tions. On the contrary, the majority found that the existing correc­
tions policy provided the press and the general public opportuni­
ties to observe prison conditions. 145 The challenged regulation had 
reversed a previous policy permitting press interviews and was 
imposed only after a violent episode that corrections officials be­
lieved was at least partially attributable to the former policy. 146 
After finding that the prison officials had shown good cause for 
the regulation, the majority disposed of the media's constitutional 
right of access argument by concluding that newsmen have no con­
141. Stewart, supra note 140, at 636 (footnote omitted). 
142. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
143. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
144. Inmates of the California prison system and representatives of the press 
instituted Pelt to challenge the constitutionality of a section of the California Depart­
ment of Corrections Manual, which provided that "[p]ress and other media inter­
views with specific individual inmates will not be permitted." 417 U.S. at 819. Saxbe 
involved a challenge by the Washington Post of a policy statement of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons which prohibited interviews of individual inmates by press repre­
sentatives, even when such interviews were requested by the inmate. The federal 
policy, however, permitted conversation "with inmates whose identity is not to be 
made public, if it is limited to the discussion of institutional facilities, programs and 
activities." Id. at 844 n.1. 
145. Id. at 830. 
146. Id. at 831 (footnote omitted). 
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stitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates or to informa­
tion beyond that afforded to the general public. 147 The majority 
also rejected the prisoners' contention that their free speech rights 
had been denied by the regulation. 148 
In Saxbe, the majority opinion, again written by Justice 
Stewart, found that the federal regulation was similarly merely a 
reiteration of the general rule that inmates may be visited only by 
a lawyer, clergyman, relative or friend. Thus the press was being 
treated the same as the public generally.149 Viewing Saxbe as "con­
stitutionally indistinguishable from Pell," the Court upheld the reg­
ulation. 15o 
The majority in both Pell and Saxbe rejected the notion that 
the press' watchdog function warranted special access rights for the 
media. That view was expressed in the dissents of Justice Douglas 
in PelP51 and ofJustice Powell in Saxbe.152 
Somewhat prophetically, Justice Douglas asked in dissent: 
"Could the government deny the press access to all public institu­
tions and prohibit interviews with all governmental employees? 
Could it find constitutional footing by expanding the ban to deny 
such access to everyone?"153 The answers were provided at least 
in part by Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 154 
On March 31, 1975, radio and television stations KQED of 
San Francisco reported the suicide of a prisoner in the Santa Rita 
Jail in Alameda County, California. The reports included a state­
ment by a psychiatrist that the conditions at the facility created the 
illnesses of his patient-prisoners there, and included a denial by 
Thomas Houchins, the Alameda County sheriff. The sheriff refused 
147. Id. at 834. 
148. Id. at 821-28. 
149. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 849. 
150. Id. at 850. 
151. 417 U.S. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice 
Douglas' Pell dissent applied as well to Saxbe. Id. at 836. Joining in Justice Douglas' 
dissent were Justices Brennan and Marshall. 
152. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 864 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
Justice Powell then examined the Prison Bureau's rationale for· the ban and found it 
insufficient for a total prohibition of prisoner-press interviews. Id. at 864-75. He fa­
vored remanding the Saxbe case "with instructions to allow the Bureau to devise a 
new policy." Id. at 874. In his Saxbe dissent, Justice Powell was joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall. Justice Powell adopted the same reasoning for his dissent on 
the press issue in Pell, in which he concurred with the majority on the prisoners' 
claims. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 835-36 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dis­
senting in part). 
153. 417 U.S. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
154. 438 U.S. I (1978). 
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KQED's request to inspect and take pictures within the facility.155 
As a result, KQED filed suit under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 156 
claiming that its First Amendment rights had been violated by the 
sheriff's failure to provide any effective means by which the public 
could be informed of conditions at the jail or could learn of the 
prisoners' grievances. 157 They further contended that television 
coverage was the most effective means of informing the public of 
jail conditions. 15s 
The district court rejected the sheriff's contention that his pol­
icies were necessary to protect inmate privacy and to minimize se­
curity and administrative problems. The court granted a prelimi­
nary injunction prohibiting the sheriff from denying KQED 
representatives and other "'responsible representatives'" of the 
news media access to the jail facilities " 'at reasonable times and 
hours' " and from" 'preventing ... [them] from utilizing photo­
graphic and sound equipment or from utilizing inmate interviews 
in providing full and accurate coverage of the ... facilities.' "159 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal, rejecting the 
sheriff's argument that Pell was controlling, and concluded that 
both the public and the media had a First Amendment right of ac­
cess to prisons and jails. 160 
In his majority opinion161 reversing the court of appeals, Chief 
Justice Burger agreed with many of KQED's generalized asser­
tions: Conditions in jails and prisons are matters of great public im~ 
155. At that time, there was apparently no formal policy regarding public ac­
cess to the jail. Id. at 4. 
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 
157. The Alameda and Oakland branches of the NAACP joined in the suit, 
claiming that public access to the information sought by KQED was essential for its 
members to participate in the public debate on jail conditions in Alameda County. 
438 U.S. at 4. 
158. Shortly after the complaint was filed, the sheriff announced a new policy 
and invited all interested persons to make arrangements for attending regular 
monthly tours of the jail facility. Id. The tours, however, were limited to twenty-five 
persons each on a first come, first served basis and did not include some of the most 
controversial areas of the jail. Photographs of selected parts of the jail were made 
available, but no cameras or tape recorders were allowed on the tours. Those on the 
tours were not permitted to interview inmates, who were generally removed from 
view. Not satisfied, KQED and the NAACP went forward with their suit. Id. at 4-5. 
159. Id. at 6. 
160. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 U.S. 1 
(1978). 
161. Chief Justice Burger's opinion was adopted by Justices White and 
Rehnquist and Justice Stewart's concurring opinion was not materially different. 

Three Justices dissented and two, Blackmun and Marshall, did not participate. 438 

U.S. at 1. 
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portance; the public can form its opinions about prison conditions 
more intelligently the greater its information; and the media, as 
the "eyes and ears" of the public, are a potentially constructive fac­
tor in remedying abuses in the conduct of public business. 162 But 
the Chief Justice could find no constitutional basis entitling the 
public or the media to enter these institutions with camera equip­
ment, and to take pictures of inmates for broadcast. More broadly, 
he rejected any intimation in previous decisions of "a First Amend­
ment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information 
within government control. "163 
The Houchins decision took two significant constitutional 
steps. First, it rejected any relationship between the press' First 
Amendment right to gather news and the responsibility of the gov­
ernment to provide information. As the Burger Court interpreted 
the earlier cases, the First Amendment concerns only the freedom 
of the media to communicate information once obtained and does 
not compel the government to provide the media with information 
or access to it on demand. According to the majority, the 
Branzburg dicta, stating that "news gathering is not without its 
First Amendment protections, "164 provided no basis to compel the 
government to supply information but stood only for the proposi­
tion that there is a right to gather news from any lawful source. 165 
Second, while the Court asserted that the issue in Houchins 
was only "a claimed special privilege of access" by the media, and 
that Fell and Saxbe were, therefore, controlling,166 Chief Justice 
Burger's decision went far beyond a repetitious denial of a special 
access right to the press. Underlying the media's access claims was 
an asserted right of the public to know what its government is 
doing and a responsibility of the press, as the public's "eyes and 
ears," to provide that information. But if the press' special role af­
forded it no special rights, the public's "right to know" fared no 
162. Id. at 8. 
163. Id. at 9. 
164. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 707. 
165. 438 U.S. at II. The majority pleaded that the Branzburg dicta "must be 
read in context." Id. at 10. Yet, it neither quoted nor discussed the stated rationale 
for the asserted First Amendment protection for newsgathering, that is, that without 
such protection "freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 408 U.S. at 681. The 
majority in Houchins apparently had no problem with eviscerating freedom of the 
press by permitting the government to shut down legal access to information while 
intimating to the press that its only constitutional right is to gather news "by means 
within the law." 438 U.S. at II (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 681). 
166. 438 U.S. at 12. 
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better. Previous Court references "to a public entitlement to infor­
mation" were dismissed as meaning "no more than that the govern­
ment cannot restrain communication of whatever information the 
media acquire."167 Specifically rejecting any notion that either the 
public or the media had a constitutional right to information about 
government activities, the majority embraced Justice Stewart's pre­
viously stated view that neither the press nor the public has a con­
stitutional right of access to particular government information. 168 
The two-pronged effect of Houchins is clear: The press has no 
special right of access to government information to inform the 
public because the public itself has no constitutional right to the 
information. The focus of First Amendment cases in this area, 
therefore, shifts from the right of the press and public to govern­
ment information to the right of the government to keep its activi­
ties secret. 
The majority attempted to excuse its position in several ways. 
The question of access to penal facilities, it asserted, presents legis­
lative and executive concerns best left to experts. No one questions 
the right and the responsibility of prison officials to impose regula­
tions designed to maximize order and minimize invasions of pri­
vacy. The very injunction appealed from limited the right of ac­
cess, for example, to "reasonable times and hours," an order 
clearly recognizing that right. But the Supreme Court's implicit 
view that requiring access and maintaining order and privacy are 
mutually exclusive is unsupported and unsupportable. 169 
The majority further asserted that media access to prisons is 
unnecessary to inform the public of jail conditions. It contended, 
for example, that visiting citizens committees had provided impe­
tus to the early English penal reform movements, and continue to 
play an important role in keeping citizens informed. 170 Grand ju­
ries and the legislature traditionally evaluate conditions in public, 
tax-supported institutions such as prisons. 171 Also, the media have 
167. Id. at 10. 
168. Id. at 14-15 (quoting Stewart, supra note 140, at 636). See note 3 supra and 
accompanying text. 
169. Sheriff Houchins contended, for example, that "unregulated access by the 
media would infringe inmate privacy, [and tend to create] 'jail celebrities,' who in 
tum [would] tend to generate internal problems and undermine jail security," and 
would otherwise "disrupt jail operations." 438 U.S. at 5 (footnote omitted). Neither 
KQED's arguments nor the district court's preliminary injunction, however, can be 
fairly read to require "unregulated access," but only access more meaningful than 
the sheriff had been willing to provide. 438 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
170. [d. at 12-13. 
171. [d. at 13. 
621 1980] MEDIA LAW PERSPECTIVE 
a First Amendment right to receive letters from inmates criticizing 
jail officials and reporting on conditions, and they are free to inter­
view prisoners' counsel, and to pursue former inmates, visitors to 
the prison, public officials, and institutional personnel,172 such as 
the complaining psychiatrist here. In California, the Board of Cor­
rections has the statutory authority to inspect prisons and the duty 
to provide a public report at regular intervals. 173 
Without pretense of expertise in penology, common sense dic­
tates that such indirect means of access constitute insufficient 
mechanisms for informing the public of prison conditions. Inmates' 
correspondence, for example, is often censored. Indeed, prior to 
commencement of KQED's suit, prison rules in Alameda County 
provided that all outgoing mail, except letters to judges and law­
yers, would be inspected and prohibited any mention in outgoing 
correspondence of the names or actions of any correctional offi­
cers.174 While former prisoners and institutional personnel may in­
form the media about prison conditions, they may have an equally 
strong interest in concealing information or a fear about revealing 
it. Pointedly, the prison psychiatrist, whose interview with KQED 
had sparked the station's initial interest in visiting the Alameda 
County facilities, was quickly discharged. 175 As to periodic inspec­
tions and reports, the Court's assumption that such activities will 
provide meaningful and disinterested information may not be 
valid. 176 
As a final justification for his conclusion, Chief Justice Burger 
took a gratuitous swipe at the media, claiming that the media as­
sumed that they were the best qualified persons for discovering 
malfeasance in public institutions. The Chief Justice not only an­
nounced that he could find no constitutional or judicial basis for 
such an assumption, but further suggested that media representa­
172. Id.at15. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The policy was eased somewhat after the 
suit was filed, deleting the latter prohibition. Id. at 22. The point here is not the in­
mate correspondence should not be censored (that is an argument for another con­
text), but only that inmate mail may not be a very useful means of obtaining informa­
tion. On the prisoners' rights issue, however, it is notable that a substantial number 
of Santa Rita inmates were not convicted criminals'b'lt detainees awaiting trial. Id. at 
37. 
175. McCormick, Press Access to Jails and Prisons, Freedom of Information 
Center Report No. 405, at 4 (1979). 
176. One commentator suggested that the potential for inefficacy of such in­
spections has been a historical problem, and quoted from Dumas' The Count of 
Monte Christo. Id. 
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tives are not confronted with being coerced by public opinion to 
disclose what they might prefer to conceal as public officers some­
times are. 177 
One can easily dismiss this straw man attack unless he be­
lieves that the foibles of journalists are any less human than anyone 
else's. KQED's argument was not that media representatives pos­
sess superior abilities to report jail conditions in an evenhanded 
manner. Instead, the media have urged a recognition of the practi­
cal as well as constitutional mandates of the situation. As a practical 
matter, not everyone can view jail conditions for themselves; like­
wise, not everyone, not even those with a vital concern for this is­
sue, wants to. Given the media's responsibility in the constitutional 
scheme of things to act for the public in watching its government's 
functions and reporting on its shortcomings, any argument that the 
press may make mistakes begs the question. As even the Chief 
Justice has recognized in other contexts, what appears in newspa­
pers and how public issues and public officials are treated are mat­
ters for editorial judgment and control. 178 
Not so easily dismissed, however, is the attitude reflected by 
the Chief Justice's argument. Judging from his remarks, Chief Just­
ice Burger has the impression that the media are pampered, 
spoiled children who carp constantly, though enjoying special privi­
leges and immunities they do not deserve. This kind of argument 
may, then, serve to tell us a good deal more about the reasons be­
hind some of the Burger Court's media law decisions than the con­
sidered reasoning in the main portions of the opinions. While the 
issues in Pell, Saxbe and Houchins were limited to media and pub­
lic access to penal institutions, their broad conclusions have found 
application in other contexts. 
B. Access to Judicial Proceedings 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale 179 involved the right of the media 
and the public to attend pretrial criminal proceedings. The Su­
preme Court, in Craig v. Harney,180 had said that events in the 
courtroom are public property. The press' right to report events 
that transpire in the courtroom was also recognized in Shep­
177. 438 U.S. at 13-14. 
178. Miami Herald Publishing CO. Y. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). See 
also Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 'y. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 
(1973). 
179. 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979). 
180. 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). 
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pard. 18l Troublesome dicta in Branzhurg,182 however, cast doubt 
on this right. Newsmen, the Court said in Branzhurg, "may be 
prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if 
. . . necessary to,assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial 
tribunal. "183 Gannett afforded the Burger Court the opportunity to 
decide whether it really meant that. It apparendy did. 
In Gannett, a trial court judge in New York granted a motion 
by two murder defendants to exclude the public and the press 
from a pretrial hearing on the defendants' motion to suppress alleg­
edly illegally obtained evidence. The case had received consider­
able local publicity, and the trial court, while recognizing a consti­
tutional right of press and public access to the proceedings, ruled 
that such a right had to be balanced against the defendants' consti­
tutional right to a fair trial. He found that in this case the latter 
outweighed the former because publicity concerning an open sup­
pression hearing would pose a reasonable probability of prejudice 
to the defendants. 184 After the appellate division reversed and va­
cated the trial judge's exclusion order,18S the New York Court of 
Appeals upheld the exclusion of the press and media from the pro­
ceedings notwithstanding New York law's presumption of open 
criminal "trials"; that presumption was overcome, the court held, 
because of the danger posed to the defendants' ability to receive a 
fair trial. 186 
181. 384 U.S. at 362-63. 
182. 408 U.S. at 665. 
183. rd. As support for this proposition, Branzburg cited only Sheppard's en­
dorsement of "stricter rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen," 
insulating witnesses from the press, and controlling extra-judicial statements to the 
press by persons involved in the trial. 384 U.S. at 358-59. But nowhere does 
Sheppard suggest, in its list of trial court powers to ensure a fair trial, that the press 
may be barred outright from courtroom proceedings, or prevented from publishing 
what they learn. 
184. In the pre-trial hearing, the defendants specifically sought suppression of 
allegedly illegally obtained confessions and physical evidence obtained as fruits of 
those confessions, including a buried revolver belonging to the murder victim, to 
which one of the defendants had led the police following his confession. 99 S. Ct. at 
2903. The defendants argued that their right to a fair trial would be denied if the evi­
dence were suppressed but reported to prospective jurors in the newspapers anyway. 
rd. 
185. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 App. Div. 2d 107,389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976), 
rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), afI'd, 99 S. Ct. 2898 
(1979). 
186. 43 N.Y.2d 370, 377, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759 (1977), 
afI'd, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979). 
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On certiorari, five Justices187 agreed that the Sixth Amend­
ment's guarantee of a "public trial" is a right personal to the ac­
cused and does not create "any right of access to a criminal trial on 
the part of the public. "188 Although the majority recognized an in­
dependent public interest in the enforcement of Sixth Amendment 
guarantees, it said that did not create a constitutional right on the 
part of the public. The public's interest, it said, was protected by 
the adversary system of criminal justice. 189 Even assuming a public 
right to open trials, however, the five Justices found no persuasive 
evidence in common law supporting the public's right to attend 
pretrial proceedings, which have never been as open to the public 
as actual trials. 190 In short, the majority could find no constitution­
al requirement for opening a pretrial criminal proceeding, such as a 
suppression hearing, to the public even though the. participants 
agreed that it should be closed to protect the defendants' right to a 
fair trial. 191 
The majority disintegrated, however, on the issue of whether 
a separate First Amendment right on the part of the press and the 
public to open criminal proceedings exists. Three of the five mem­
bers of the majority192 evaded the question with the excuse that 
the trial court had assumed First Amendment rights to exist and 
had made its exclusionary order after assessing the competing soci­
187. Justice Stewart wrote the majority's opinion. He was joined by the Chief 
Justice and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens. 
188. 99 S. Ct. at 2905. 
189. Id. at 2907. The majority noted, for example, that the public's interest in 
jury trials is protected by the rule that a defendant cannot waive a jury trial without 
the consent of the prosecutor and judge. "But if the defendant waives his right to a 
jury trial, and the prosecutor and the judge consent, it could hardly be seriously ar­
gued that a member of the public could demand a jury trial because of the societal 
interest in that mode offact-finding." Id. 
190. Id. at 2909, 2910. 
191. Id. at 2908. In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, 
White and Marshall, argued that the Sixth Amendment does create an independent 
constitutional interest on the part of the public in open criminal trials and that the 
public may not be constitutionally barred from such trials "without affording full and 
fair consideration to the public's interests in maintaining an open proceeding." Id. at 
2933 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenters also would have held that the pub­
lie's constitutional interest in open criminal proceedings extends to pretrial suppres­
sion hearings as well as to trials themselves, because such hearings resemble and re­
late "to the full trial in almost every particular" and are often critical and "may be 
decisive, in the prosecution of a criminal case." Id. Finally, the dissenters felt that 
the facts of this case did not present sufficient reason for concern about the defend­
ants' fair trial rights to justify abridgement of the public's right to open proceedings. 
Id. 
192. ChiefJustice Burger, Justices Stewart and Stevens. 
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etal interests involved rather than determining that First Amend­
ment freedoms were not implicated. 193 Thus, the actions of the 
trial judge were found to be "consistent with any right of access" 
the complaining newspaper "may have had" under the First 
Amendment,194 rendering it unnecessary to decide the First 
Amendment issue. 
Justice Powell, in a separate opinion, joined in the majority's 
opinion but announced that he would hold explicitly that the peti­
tioner's reporter had an interest protected by the First and Four­
teenth Amendments in being present at the pretrial suppression 
hearing. Justice Powell did not recognize any absolute right of ac­
cess to courtroom proceedings, however, because he believed it 
was limited by the constitutional right of defendants to a fair trial 
and by the government's need to obtain just convictions and to 
preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information and the iden­
tity of informants. 19s On balance, Justice Powell believed that the 
trial court correctly concluded that the defendants' Sixth Amend­
ment fair trial rights would have been sufficiently endangered to 
warrant an abridgement of the First Amendment rights of the pub­
lic and press. 
Justice Rehnquist also wrote separately on the First Amend­
ment issue, but found no First Amendment right of access in the 
public or the press to judicial or other governmental proceedings. 
The First Amendment, he said, is not a constitutional sunshine law 
requiring notice, an opportunity to be heard and substantial rea­
sons before the public and press may be excluded from a govern­
mental proceeding. 19s 
Although four Justices dissented from the majority's position 
that the Sixth Amendment creates no independent public right to 
open trials, Justice Powell was not joined by any of the dissenters 
on the First Amendment question. Writing for all four dissenters, 
Justice Blackmun stated that the Sixth Amendment fixed the press' 
and the public's right of access; he rejected the complaining news­
paper's argument that the First Amendment requires that the free 
flow of information about judicial proceedings not be cut off with­
out justifying a prior restraint. But Justice Blackmun found no 
need to address the broader issue of First Amendment access, 
193. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. at 2912 (quoting Saxbe v. Wash­
ington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 860 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
194. 99 S. Ct. at 2912 (emphasis added). 
195. ld. at 2914, 2915 (Powell, J., concurring). 
196. ld. at 2918 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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believing that the Sixth Amendment protected the right of ac­
cess. 197 
The Chief Justice, while joining in the majority's opinion, 
wrote separately to "emphasize" his view of pretrial motions to 
suppress evidence in criminal cases and took great pains to distin­
guish hearings on such motions from criminal trials. But what he 
was trying to tell us is obscure. If Gannett had involved a closed 
criminal trial rather than a pretrial hearing, would he have voted 
differently? He did say that, by definition, "a hearing on a motion 
before trial to suppress evidence is not a trial; it is a pre trial [sic] 
hearing,"198 and his italicization might suggest a different conclu­
sion in a case involving the closure of a trial. He also italicized the 
word "accused" in his quotation of the Sixth Amendment,199 indi­
cating an adoption of the view of the four other majority Justices 
that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial belongs to the ac­
cused, not to the public. He also stated that the public's "interest" 
in public trials "alone does not create a constitutional right. "200 
Moreover, he joined in the majority opinion, with its explicit state­
ment that the Sixth Amendment may not be properly viewed as 
embodying a constitutional right of the public to attend criminal 
trials. It would be dangerous, then, to assume that the Chief Just­
ice intended to say that he would have taken a different view of a 
case involving a closed criminal trial. 
Depending on one's point of view, 201 lower court judges, after 
Gannett, either exercised restraint in the use of their new power to 
close criminal pretrial proceedings or stampeded to the courthouse 
doors to close them to the press and public. Newsweek reported 
197. Id. at 2940 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
198. Id. at 2913 (Burger, C.]., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
199. "The Sixth Amendment states that 'in all criminal prosecutions, the ac­
cused shall enjoy the right to a ... public trial.' " Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI) 
(emphasis added). 
200. Id. 
201. The press reacted to Gannett swiftly and predictably. Allen H. Neuharth, 
chairman of Gannett Co., Inc., and chairman and president of the American Newspa­
per Publishers Association, described the decision as "saying that the judiciary is a 
private Supreme Club, which can shut the door and conduct public business in pri­
vate." Press Sees Public Rights Jeopardized, Publisher's Auxiliary, July 9, 1979, at 3, 
col. 1. The National Newspaper Association charged that "the twin concepts of a free 
press and the public's right to know have been dealt another serious blow in the in­
terest of going to an extreme to ensure a fair trial." Id. Jack Landau, director of the 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, asserted that the decision would 
"deprive the public of timely and critical information about the criminal justice 
process." Id. . 
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that, in the month following Gannett, at least thirteen judges shut 
their courtrooms while sixteen judges rejected motions to do so. 
Inexplicably, three judges "barred the press, but not the pub­
· IC. "2021
Public debate over the wisdom of the Gannett decision, how­
ever, was quickly overshadowed by a new debate among the Just­
ices themselves over the scope of the decision. Did Gannett au­
thorize trial court judges to close full criminal trials as well as 
pretrial proceedings? The Chief Justice has said publicly that the 
Gannett decision was limited to pretrial hearings;203 but Justice 
Blackmun, who led the dissent in Gannett, has just as publicly dis­
agreed, stating that the decision allowed the closure of full trials. 204 
Justice Powell, however, has somewhat cryptically suggested that 
trial judges might be "a bit premature" to read meanings into 
Gannett beyond its narrow holding. 205 
Whatever the subliminal message of Chief Justice Burger's 
concurring opinion in Gannett, he clearly intended to confine his 
vote to pretrial proceedings. Since his vote was crucial to the ma­
jority, it would appear that trial judges were being "a bit prema­
ture" in reading Gannett to mean that full trials may be closed. In 
fact, the Supreme Court has held recently that the First and Four­
teenth Amendments do guarantee to the public and the press a 
right to attend criminal trials absent an overriding interest. Justice 
Powell took no part in the decision and only Justice Rehnquist dis­
sented. 206 
C. Access to Public Records 
1. Judicial Records 
The Burger Court has considered both constitutional and stat­
utory claims of a right on the part of the press and the public to in­
spect public documents and records. The results have not deviated 
markedly from those in other access cases. 
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. ,207 seven Justices 
agreed that neither the press nor the public had a constitutional or 
202. Press, Open and Shut Cases, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 1979, at 69. 
203. Confusion in the Courts, TIME, Sept. 17, 1979, at 82. 
204. Greenhouse, Appeal Could Clarify Justices' Stand on Closed Courts, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 4, 1979, at 15, col. 1. 
205. Id. 
206. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 48 U.S.L.W. 5008 (July 2, 1980). 
207. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
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common law right to inspect or copy tape recordings of White 
House conversations admitted into evidence during the criminal 
trial of Watergate figures John Mitchell, H.R. Haldeman, John 
Ehrlichman, Kenneth Parkinson and Robert Mardian. The jury and 
the public had heard some twenty-two hours of taped conversations 
during the course of the trial; and transcripts of the conversations, 
although not admitted into evidence, were furnished by the district 
court to the jurors, reporters and members of the public in attend­
ance at the trial and were widely reprinted in the press. 
Six weeks after trial had begun, several broadcasting organiza­
tions sought permission of the district court to copy, broadcast and 
sell to the public the portions of the tapes played at trial. Former 
President Nixon, who asserted both property interests in the tapes 
and executive privilege, opposed these requests. Judge Gesell rea­
soned that the common law privilege of public access to judicial re­
cords permitted the broadcasters to obtain copies of exhibits in the 
custody of the clerk, including the tapes. Because of potential 
administrative and mechanical difficulties, however, he prohibited 
copying until termination of the trial. 208 The matter was thereafter 
retransferred to Judge Sirica, the trial judge in the Watergate con­
spiracy trial. Judge Sirica denied without prejudice the broadcast­
ers' petitions for immediate access to the tapes, noting that all four 
men convicted at trial had filed notices of appeal, and declaring 
that their rights could be prejudiced by immediate access followed 
by public dissemination of the recordings. 209 
The court of appeals reversed, finding that the district court 
had abused its discretion in allowing the mere possibility of preju­
dice to the defendants' rights in the event of a retrial to outweigh 
the public's right of access to judicial records. Although the court 
of appeals' decision was based upon a common law interest in ac­
cess, its opinion noted that the First Amendment sharply limited 
the court's power to control the uses to which the tapes are put 
once they are released. 210 
208. United States v. Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1974). 
209. United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 186 (D. D.C. 1975), rev'd, 551 F.2d 
1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 
U.S. at 589. 
210. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1263 n.52 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd 
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 589 (emphasis by the 
Court). District court Judge Gesell, by contrast, had cautioned against 
"overcommercialization" of the evidence and had requested the parties to submit 
proposals for access and copying procedures that would minimize such over­
commercialization. United States v. Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D.D.C. 1974). 
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In an opmIOn delivered by Justice Powell, five Justices held 
that, considering all circumstances, the common law right of access 
to judicial records did not authorize release of the tapes from the 
district court's custody. The majority noted that the common law 
right of access to judicial records was infrequently litigated; and, 
therefore, its contours had not been delineated precisely. No pre­
vious case addressed the applicability of the common law right to 
exhibits subpoenaed from third parties. 211 
Justice Powell's opinion purportedly followed established pre­
cedent recognizing "a general right to inspect and copy public re­
cords and documents, including judicial records and docu­
ments. "212 That right is not conditioned on a proprietary interest in 
the document or upon its evidentiary value in a lawsuit. 213 Beyond 
this, and declarations that there is no absolute right to inspect and 
copy judicial records214 and that the trial court should decide the 
issue of access,215 the majority made no further effort to delineate 
precisely the contours of the common law right. 216 The majority 
did not feel required to weigh the interests advanced by the par­
ties in this case217 because it believed that the Presidential Record­
211. 435 U.S. at 597. Some of the tapes had been received by the Watergate 
Special Prosecutor follOWing the issuance of a 1973 subpoena duces tecum directing 
then President Nixon to produce certain tapes, the existence of which had been re­
vealed in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities. Id. at 591. The subpoena was upheld in In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. 
Supp. 1 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
More tapes were made available following a second subpoena duces tecum issued in 
1974 in preparation for the Mitchell trial. That subpoena was upheld in United 
States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1326 (D. D.C.), afI'd sub nom. United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
212. 435 U.S. at 597 (footnotes omitted). 
213. Id. at 597. 
214. "Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, and ac­
cess has been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for improper 
purposes," such as gratification of private spite or promotion of public scandal 
through the publication of details of divorce cases or the use of judicial records as 
sources of business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing. Id. 
at 598. 
215. Id. at 599. 
216. [d. 
217. On the broadcasters' side of the scales were the incremental gain in public 
understanding of the Watergate scandal and the presumption, however gauged, in fa­
vor of public access to judicial records. On former President Nixon's side were his 
asserted proprietary and privacy interests, the liIilit~d use of the subpoena tapes as 
authorized by United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), and the asserted impropri­
ety of facilitation by the courts of the commercialization of the tapes. 435 U.S. at 
600-02. 
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ings and Materials Preservation Act (Act)218 provided an alternative 
means of public access that justified denying release. 219 
That Act created an administrative procedure for processing 
and releasing to the public, on terms meeting with congressional 
approval, all of former President Nixon's materials of historical in­
terest, including recordings of the conversations at issue. This 
meant to the majority that the district court was, thus, not the only 
potential source of information regarding these materials, and that 
the existence of the Act was crucial to exercising discretion regard­
ing release of the tapes. 220 
Following this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion meant 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying imme­
diate public access to the tapes, and that the court of appeals erred 
in its review by failing to add the weight of the Act to former Pres­
ident Nixon's side of the scales. 221 Application of such reasoning 
seemingly would have established that the public's right of access 
to judicial records did not require release of the tapes, but the ma­
jority actually held that the common law right of access did not au­
thorize release of the tapes from the district court's custody. 222 
Perhaps it was merely a slip of Justice Powell's pen, but his choice 
of words appears to imply that something more than a weighing of 
interests is involved in cases of this nature. An argument could be 
constructed from this language prohibiting public access to judicial 
records absent proof of authorization by those seeking access. This 
would appear to gauge any presumption in favor of public access to 
judicial records quite narrowly indeed. 
218. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2017, 3315-3324 (1976). 
219. 435 U.S. at 606. 
220. [d. at 607. 
221. The majority did not hold that the Act prohibited the district court from 
releasing the tapes. Indeed, the Act appeared not to cover the handling of the spe­
cific tapes at issue because they were copies of the original tapes and were not made 
until after the time period relevant to the Act. [d. at 603-04 & n.15. In partial dissent, 
Justices White and Brennan argued that the Act required delivery of all copies made 
from the original Nixon White House tapes to the Administrator of General Services, 
who alone (subject to congressional approval) had the power to regulate public ac­
cess to the tapes. Justices White and Brennan, like the majority, would have reversed 
the court of appeals' decision, but would have further ordered the delivery of the 
district court's copies of the tapes to the Administrator. [d. at 611-12 (White, J., dis­
senting in part). The majority, however, did not feel compelled to rule on the appli­
cability of the Act to the specific tapes at issue. [d. at 604 n.15. For them, the Act's 
only relevance to the case before the Court was that the Act provided an additional 
outlet to the public for the contents of the tapes. 
222. [d. at 608. 
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The majority referred to Nixon as a concededly singular 
case223 and to the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preserva­
tion Act as a unique element. 224 As to the issues of the scope and 
application of the public's common law right of access to judicial 
records, Nixon may not be broadly applied in future cases. The 
majority's determination of the broadcasters' constitutional argu­
ments, however, will have significant influence. In support of their 
position, the broadcasters relied on both the First and Sixth 
Amendments for the proposition that the Constitution required 
public access to the tapes played· in open court. The majority re­
jected the arguments based on both amendments. 
As to the First Amendment, the broadcasters relied on Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,225 which held that the First Amend­
ment prohibited a state from outlawing the press from publishing 
information in the public domain on official court records. 226 They 
argued that Cox guaranteed the press' access to exhibits and mate­
rials displayed in open court, but the majority limited Cox to 
merely affirming the right of the press to publish accurately infor­
mation contained in court records open to the public. 227 Cox did 
not apply, the majority ruled, because what was involved here was 
an asserted right to physical access to copies of the White House 
tapes when the public had never received any such access. 228 
Since the First Amendment generally does not grant the press a 
right to information about a trial superior to that of the general 
public, it did not compel press access to the tapes at issue. 229 
The majority also rejected the broadcasters' argument that the 
223. ld. 
224. ld. at 603. 
225. 420 U.S. 469 (1975); see text accompanying notes 473-88 infra. 
226. 420 U.S. at 495. 
227. 435 U.S. at 609. 
228. Jurors, reporters and members of the public were provided with ear­
phones during the Mitchell trial through which the portions of the tapes presented in 
evidence were played. ld. at 594. As aids in listening to the exhibits, transcripts of 
the tapes were provided to the jurors, counsel and news media representatives in at­
tendance and these transcripts were widely reprinted in the press. ld. at 593 n.3, 
594. The tapes themselves (that is, the district court's copies of the original tapes) re­
mained in the custody of the district court, but were not made available by the court 
for inspection or copying. ld. at 594 nn.3 & 4. 
229. ld. at 609-10. The majority did not indicate the extent to which its deter­
mination of the First Amendment issue was influenced by the crucial fact that the 
broadcasters required a court's cooperation in furthering their commercial plans. The 
commercial plans involved were desired by some of those seeking permission to 
copy the tapes to sell to the public the portions of the tapes played at trial. ld. at 
594, 602-03. 
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Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public trial required release of 
the tapes to facilitate public understanding of the Mitchell trial and 
to permit the public to form its own judgments as to the meaning 
of the recorded conversations. First, the majority found, the argu­
ment proved too much because the same could be said of live testi­
mony, yet no constitutional right exists to have such testimony re­
corded and broadcasted. 230 Second, the purpose of the public trial 
guarantee is not to confer any special benefit on the press, but to 
assure that the courts do not become instruments of persecution. 
The Court said that the Sixth Amendment is satisfied if the public 
and the press have an opportunity to attend the trial and to report 
what they have observed, as was the case here. 231 
Two Justices dissented in the result. Justice Marshall did not 
consider the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation 
Act decisive since by its terms it did not apply to the district 
court's copies of the original White House tapes. He argued that 
the Act strongly indicated that the tapes should be released to the 
public. 232 Justice Stevens similarly found the majority's reliance 
upon the Act ironic. 233 Neither dissenting Justice directly confronted 
the constitutional issues. But Justice Stevens' references to United 
States v. Mitchell234 and to the Mitchell trial's "special characteris­
tics" and to the "great historical interest" in "the conduct disclosed 
by the evidence," the full understanding of which "may affect the 
future operation of our institutions, "235 could serve as the basis for 
a response to the majority's rather pedantic disposition of the 
broadcasters' First Amendment argument. The reason no First 
Amendment right exists to broadcast the testimony of live 
witnesses at an ordinary criminal trial is the perception that the 
First Amendment must yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial free of the distractions caused by 
cameras, flood lights and tape recorders.236 No such considerations 
were involved here. Justice Stevens' language, however, suggests 
the more compelling insufficiency of the majority's constitutional 
230. [d. at 610 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-42 (1965)). 
231. 435 U.S. at 610. C/. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 2909 
(1979) (the press may not have access under the circumstances of Gannett). See text 
accompanying notes 179-206 supra. 
232. 435 U.S. at 613 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
233. [d. at 616-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
234. 377 F. Supp. 1326 (D. D.C.), a/I'd sub nom. United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683 (1974). 
235. [d. at 616. 
236. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
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analysis: this was no ordinary criminal trial. Whatever the usual 
standard to be applied in ordinary cases involving an asserted First 
Amendment right of access to judicial records, the Watergate trial 
undoubtedly warranted a special standard. As Justice Stevens 
noted, this was not a case in which the media argued a right to 
broadcast testimony to enable the public to make its own informed 
verdict of the guilt or innocence of the accused. It was the conduct 
disclosed by the evidence, not the persuasiveness of the evidence 
in the context of the criminal trial, that the public had an interest 
in. The need for a full public understanding of that conduct, based 
upon its own interpretations of the conversants' statements, tones 
of voice and inflections, made this a special case. The majority's 
failure to perceive that makes the result in Nixon difficult to ac­
cept. 
2. Freedom of Information Act-Agency Records 
The Supreme Court made two significant rulings in 1979 con­
cerning the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)237 that, while not 
involving media parties directly, will influence the ability of the 
press to obtain, through FOIA, public records in 'the hands of fed­
eral agencies. 
In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown238 a unanimous Court construed 
FOIA exclusively as a disclosure statute which affords no private 
right of action to enjoin agency disclosure to parties to government 
contracts compelled by government regulations to supply sensitive 
information to various agencies. The Act's provisions exempting 
certain categories of records from FOIA's disclosure requirements 
were viewed only as being concerned with the agencies' need or 
preference for confiden tiality and not as mandating nondisclosure 
even if the agency had no objection to disclosure. By itself, the 
Court said, FOIA protects the interests of private parties sub­
mitting information only to the extent that the agency receiving the 
information endorses those interests. 
237. 5 U.S.c. § 552 (1976). FOIA essentially requires, inter alia, that federal 
agencies make available for inspection and copying, on demand, records in their pos­
session and under their control, unless such records fall within specified categories 
of exemptions. Earlier Burger Court FOIA decisions include NLRB v. Robbins Tire 
& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978); Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 
352 (1976); FAA Adm'r v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975); Renegotiation Bd. v. 
Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp., 421 U.S. 168 (1975); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
421 U.S. 132 (1975); Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 
(1974); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). 
238. 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979). 
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Chrysler Corporation had sought to enjoin disclosure by the 
Department of Defense's Defense Logistics Agency of certain sub­
missions by Chrysler reporting on its affirmative action employ­
ment programs. The reports had been submitted pursuant to regu­
lations requiring such information of all government contractors. 
Notwithstanding exemption from mandatory disclosure by FOIA, 
the regulations provided for availability of such information to the 
public upon a determination that disclosure would further the pub­
lic interest and would not impede agency functions, except where 
such disclosure was prohibited by law. Chrysler argued that disclo­
sure of its submissions was barred by FOIA exemptions and would 
be inconsistent with the Trade Secrets Act239 which imposes crimi­
nal sanctions on government employees who disclose to any extent 
not authorized by law certain classes of information submitted to a 
government agency, including confidential statistical data. 
Besides rejecting Chrysler's arguments that FOIA mandated 
nondisclosure of the exempted categories of information and that it 
created a private right of action to enjoin disclosure of exempted 
material, the Court also held that the Trade Secrets Act did not af­
ford a private right of action to enjoin disclosure in violation of that 
statute. Even though the Court deemed disclosure of the material 
not authorized by law within the meaning of the Trade Secrets Act, 
it could find nothing in that Act to afford a private right of action 
under this criminal statute, especially since the agency's decision 
was reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. 240 Unless 
overruled by congressional action, Chrysler's effect should put an 
end to most reverse-FOIA suits by private entities seeking to avoid 
government disclosure of exempted information produced by them 
to government agencies. 241 
The Supreme Court's second significant FOIA decision in 1979 
was Federal Open Market Commission of the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem v. Merrill,242 where seven Justices243 rejected an argument 
that federal agencies have a right under FOIA to delay release of 
policy reports merely because they deem such delay to be neces­
sary to protect their own efficiency. At the same time they recog­
239. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). 
240. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). 
241. For a discussion of some of these suits by private parties, see Schorr, Tell­
ing Tales: How Law Is Being Used to Pry Business Secrets From Uncle Sam's Files, 
Wall St. J., May 9, 1977, at 1, col. 6. 
242. 99 S. Ct. 2800 (1979). 
243. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. 
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nized a "qualified privilege" in the Act for confidential commercial 
information generated by the government itself in the process lead­
ing up to awarding a contract. This "qualified privilege" permitted 
the Federal Reserve System to delay public disclosure of certain 
monthly monetary directives that were in effect, provided the di­
rectives contained sensitive information not otherwise available and 
immediate release of the directives would significantly harm the 
government's monetary functions or commercial interests. 244 
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the directives were ei­
ther required by FOIA to be released currently or were exempted 
from the Act, in which case its provisions did not apply.245 He 
could find no middle ground for another alternative for exempt ma­
terial to which the Act nonetheless applies, even though on a de­
layed basis. 246 Since he could find no exemption in FOIA concern­
ing the directives, Justice Stevens would have held that the statute 
mandated current availability to the public. He said that the major­
ity's newly created category, would impose substantial litigation 
costs and burdens on any party seeking to overcome an agency's 
objection to immediate disclosure. 247 
IV. THE SANCTITY OF THE NEWSROOM 
A. Public Access to the Media 
In an influential 1967 article, Professor Jerome A. Barron ar­
gued that the prevailing First Amendment theory of a self­
operating "marketplace of ideas" had become outmoded. The mod­
ern mass media, he asserted, had closed the marketplace to 
unorthodox points of view by denying them access to media outlets 
while hiding behind the First Amendment to claim immunity for 
their actions. Professor Barron maintained that the constitutional 
imperative of free expression had devolved into a rationale for re­
pressing competing ideas and that First Amendment theory must 
be reexamined in order that the constitutional guarantee of free 
speech best serve its original purposes. 248 
244. 99 S. Ct. at 2812, 2814. 
245. Id. at 2815-16 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(I), (b) (1976) (Stevens, J., dis­
senting)). 
246. Id. at 2816. 
247. Id. "For henceforth, that party must prove that compliance with the stat­
ute's disclosure mandate would not 'significantly harm the Government's monetary 
functions or commercial interests.' " Id. 
248. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1641, 1642 (1967). 
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To promote dissemination and confrontation of diverse view­
points, Professor Barron urged that the right to be heard should be 
recognized as a constitutional principle, and he proposed that the 
courts establish a remedy for a right of access. In the alternative, 
he suggested that a forum for the expression of diverging opinions 
was secured in the constitutional law which authorized a carefully 
framed right of access statute which would forbid an arbitrary de­
nial of space. 249 
Professor Barron's comments immediately received consider­
able attention,250 with an ensuing debate over the validity of his 
premise and the wisdom of his proposals. Within seven years, how­
ever, the Burger Court laid to rest any right of access to the print 
media. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 251 the Su­
preme Court overturned a Florida decision upholding the constitu­
tionality of a right of access statute. 252 The Florida Supreme Court 
had embraced the view that since ownership of the mass media 
was being concentrated in a limited number of hands, a form of 
private censorship existed which jeopardized the public's right to 
know all sides of a controversy. It upheld the statute on the theory 
that it prohibited nothing and required additional information for 
full and fair discussion. 253 
249. Id. at 1678. Professor Barron further developed his access theory in a 
series of subsequent articles. See Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of 
Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969); Barron, Access-The Only 
Choice for the Media?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 766 (1970). 
250. See, e.g., the literature compiled in Lange, The Role of the Access Doc­
trine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 
N.C.L. REV. 1 (1973). 
251. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
252. See Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973), 
rev'd, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The statute in question, FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973), read 
as follows: 
104.38 Newspaper assailing candidate in an election; space for reply-If 
any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate 
for nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candidate with 
malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, 
or gives to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon 
request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may 
make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the 
matter that calls for such reply, provided such reply does not take up more 
space than the matter replied to. Any person or firm failing to comply with 
the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first de­
gree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083. 
418 U.S. at 244-45 n.2 (citing FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973)). 
253. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 82-83 (Fla. 1973), 
rev'd, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). This case arose when the Miami Herald refused a legisla­
tive candidate's demand under the statute for reply space following an editorial at­
637 1980] MEDIA LAW PERSPECTIVE 
The United States Supreme Court's virtually unanimous opin­
ion, delivered by Chief Justice Burger, said that the clear impli­
cation of the Court's previous decisions was that it was 
unconstitutional for the media to publish that which "reason" tells 
should not be published. 254 While recognizing the undoubtedly de­
sirable goal of a responsible press, the Court declared that the 
press' sense of responsibility is not mandated by the Constitu­
tion. 255 Moreover, the opinion found that the statute exacted an 
impermissible penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper, 
consisting of the cost in printing and composing time and materials 
and of taking up space that could be devoted to other material that 
the newspaper may have preferred to print. 256 Chief Justice 
Burger also found the statute repugnant because of its intrusion 
into the function of editors. Government regulation of the editorial 
process, the Court found, could not coexist with the First Amend­
ment. 257 
While a clear victory for the media, the Court's opinion in 
Tornillo is lamentable in several respects. First, it painstakingly set 
out the arguments in favor of Professor Barron's access theory, 
including the statistics pointing to a rapidly increasing concentra­
tion of newspaper ownership but dispensed with a studied refuta­
tacking him and his candidacy. The candidate sued for declaratory and injunctive re­
lief and for damages. The Miami Herald responded by seeking a declaration that the 
statute was unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court's decision upholding the 
statute was a reversal of the trial court's ruling that the legislation was an 
unconstitutional infringement on the freedom of the press. 38 Fla. Supp. 80 (1972). 
254. 418 U.S. at 256. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 258. Justices Brennan and Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion for 
the sole purpose of pointing out that the Court's decision in Tornillo was limited to 
"right of reply" statutes and implied no view upon the constitutionality of "retraction" 
statutes affording plaintiffs able to prove defamatory falsehoods a statutory action to 
require publication of a retraction. [d. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
Justice White, concurring, agreed with the Chief Justice that the Florida statute 
violated the First Amendment proposition that government may not force a news­
paper to print copy which, in its journalistic discretion, it chooses to leave on the 
newsroom floor. Id. at 261 (White, J., concurring). Justice White viewed Tornillo as 
a proper balance between First Amendment interests and the government's legiti­
mate concern for protecting individual reputational interests. But he took the occa­
sion to express his view that the result in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1974), announced on the same day an.d discussed below, represented an improper 
balance of these same two interests because, in' his view, Gertz went far toward 
eviscerating the effectiveness of the ordinary libel action, thereby deprecating indi­
vidual dignity and leaving people at the complete mercy of the press. Id. at 262, 
262-63. 
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tion. Instead, it relied heavily on other decisions which assumed 
that access requirements were unconstitutional, without justifYing 
that assumption substantively.258 Commentators have even as­
serted, not without some justification, that the Tornillo opinion 
lacked reasoned support. 259 Rather, the Tornillo decision simply 
decided that editorial content should be left to the discretion of the 
editors and that principle was not outweighed by whether more in­
formation would reach more people. 260 Regrettably, the lack of 
substantial refutation to Professor Barron's arguments in Chief Just­
ice Burger's approach may permit a resurrection of the access 
theory and a successful effort in the future to permit governmental 
intervention in the editorial process. There are even those among 
us who fear that Chief Justice Burger, faced with eight other Just­
ices not persuaded by the access theory, elected to write the Tor­
nillo opinion in such a way as to leave open the possibility that an­
other court less interested in editors' First Amendment role might 
adopt the access theory. The paranoia that has sprung from the 
Chief Justice's announced views of the press in general, and editors 
in particular, has no doubt fueled this fear. 
Perhaps more remarkable, the Tornillo opinion conflicts abso­
lutely with the Supreme Court's previous decision concerning the 
public's right of access to the broadcast media. That decision con­
cerned the Fairness Doctrine of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), formally announced in 1949, requiring broad­
casters to devote a reasonable percentage of time to the coverage 
of public issues and offer "fair" coverage by providing an opportu­
nity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints. 261 
The Fairness Doctrine, as developed by the FCC,262 focuses 
258. Abrams, In Defense of Tornillo, 86 YALE L.J. 361, 364 (1976). The opin­
ions referred to were Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela­
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); Asso­
ciated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1945). 
Professor Abrams defends the Chief Justice's use of these opinions by noting 
that his decision "claimed no more of the earlier opinions than that they had long 
since placed a 'judicial gloss' on the First Amendment strongly pointing to the un­
constitutionality of compulsory access. And they had." Abrams, supra at 373 (foot­
note omitted). 
259. Abrams, supra note 258, at 363 (footnote omitted). 
260. Id. at 367 (footnote omitted). 
261. FCC, Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 
(1949). 
262. The Doctrine was refined in FCC, Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest 
Standards, Fairness Report Regarding Handling of Public Issues, 39 Fed. Reg. 26, 
372 (1974). 
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more particularly on broadcast personal attacks and political edito­
rials. The Commission's regulations require that, in the event of a 
personal attack on an identified person during the course of a pre­
sentation of views on a controversial issue, the broadcaster notify 
the attacked individual and offer him a reasonable opportunity to 
respond. In the event of a political endorsement by a broadcast sta­
tion, the licensee must afford an opportunity to respond by the en­
dorsed candidate's opponents or their spokesmen. 263 
The Warren Court declared these regulations constitutionally 
permissible in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 264 Red Lion, to­
gether with its companion case, United States v. Radio Television 
News Directors Association (RTNDA),265 and Tornillo appear 
factually indistinguishable. Like Tornillo, RTNDA involved political 
editorials. 266 Like Tornillo, Red Lion involved an attack on an 
identified individual published by the media. 267 Like Tornillo, Red 
Lion and RTNDA involved a governmentally imposed requirement 
that the subject of a personal attack be given an opportunity to re­
spond in the same medium in which the attack occurred. Yet the 
Warren Court decided unanimously in favor of the regulation in 
Red Lion, and the Burger Court decided unanimously in favor of 
the press in Tornillo. The only difference between the cases is the 
medium involved; Red Lion concerned broadcasting, Tornillo a 
newspaper. Why the result in Tornillo differed from Red Lion re­
mains a complete mystery since Red Lion was not even cited in 
Tornillo. 
Adding to the mystery, the Warren Court found persuasive 
virtually the identical arguments the Burger Court rejected: 
1. Scarcity. The Warren Court found government regulation 
263. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1979). 
264. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
265. 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
266. Rather than involving a particular broadcast, RTNDA arose as an action to 
review the FCC's 1967 promulgation of the personal attack and political editorial 
regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1979). The rules were held unconstitutional by the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit as abridging the freedoms of speech and 
press. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th 
Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
267. Red Lion actually arose before the final promulgation of the FCC's per­
sonal attack regulations and was litigated under the Commission's broader Fairness 
Doctrine as interpreted in the personal attack context in Times-Mirror Broadcasting 
Co., 24 HAD. REG. (P & F) 404 (1962). Red Lion Broadcasting appealed an order of 
the FCC that it provide reply time to an individual attacked in a broadcast carried by 
its station. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the Commis­
sion's order. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), 
aff'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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of broadcast media content necessary in Red Lion because of the 
scarcity of broadcast channels and the inability of all citizens to 
broadcast their views on the limited number of available frequen­
cies. 268 Even recognizing rapid technological advances, such as mi­
crowave transmission, that have created more efficient use of spec­
trum space, the Court declared that there is still concern about 
scarcity of available frequencies. 269 This scarcity was found in Red 
Lion to be a justification for the FCC's regulations. In Tornillo, the 
Burger Court found a greater scarcity to exist in newspapers, to­
gether with a trend toward chain-owned newspapers. The Court 
was concerned that chain-owned newspapers made the industry 
less competitive and increased the potential for a fewer number of 
industry leaders to manipulate popular opinion and to influence the 
course of events. 270 Yet this scarcity of newspaper outlets did not, 
in the Burger Court's view, outweigh the newspapers' First 
Amendment immunity from government intrusion in the editorial 
process. 
2. Monopolization. In Red Lion, the Warren Court, referring 
to "frequency monopolies" conferred by the government on a rela­
tively small number of licensees, declared that the First Amend­
ment provided "no sanctuary" for "unlimited private censorship 
operating in a medium not open to aI1."271 In Tornillo, the Burger 
Court pointed out that one-newspaper towns predominate and only 
four percent of the large cities have competing newspapers.272 The 
Court also found that this monopoly of the means of communica­
tion lessened the public's ability to respond or to contribute 
meaningfully to the debate on issues. 273 Further, the same eco­
nomic factors that have led to the demise of competing newspapers 
and the creation of monopoly markets have also prevented new 
market entrants. 274 Yet the Burger Court considered this monopoly 
power, greater in the newspaper field than in either television or 
radio, to be insufficient to require public access to the print media. 
3. Enhancement of Free Speech. In both Red Lion and Tor­
nillo, the proponents of media access argued that the government's 
268. 395 u.s. at 376-77. 
269. Id. at 396-97. 
270. 418 U.S. at 249. 

27l. 395 U.S. at 390, 392. 

272. 418 U.S. at 249 n.13 (quoting A. Balk, Background Paper, reprinted in 
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE REPORT FOR A NATIONAL NEWS COUN­
CIL, A FREE AND RESPONSIVE PRESS 18 (1973)). 
273. Id. at 250. 
274. Id. at 25l. 
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access requirements enhanced, rather than abridged, free speech 
because of the requirements' guarantees that all viewpoints would 
be published. The Warren Court, apparently persuaded by this ar­
gument in the broadcasting context, explained that a goal of the 
First Amendment was to produce "an informed public capable of 
conducting its own aH'airs"275 and found nothing inconsistent with 
that goal in requiring the opportunity to respond to personal at­
tacks or political endorsements. In Tornillo, the Florida Supreme 
Court had found that the statute at issue did not impinge First 
Amendment rights because it did not exclude any newspaper con­
tent. 276 The Burger Court disagreed, finding that the statute had 
the same effect as a statute or regulation forbidding publication of 
specified matter. Governmental restraints on publication, it said, 
could be subject to constitutional limitations on governmental pow­
ers.277 
4. Reduction of Discussion of Controversial Issues. In Tor­
nillo, the Burger Court expressed the fear that publishers faced 
with the penalties that would accrue upon the publication of news 
or commentary within the reach of the right of access statute278 
might well choose to avoid controversy. If that were the case, such 
statutes would only serve to blunt or reduce political and electoral 
coverage. 279 In Red Lion, however, the Court abruptly dismissed 
such fears as speculative. 280 
5. Rights of the Public. The Warren Court, in Red Lion, an­
nounced that nothing in the First Amendment prevented the gov­
ernment from requiring a broadcast licensee to act as a proxy or fi­
duciary for the public, with an obligation to present views 
unrepresentative of the community that would otherwise not be 
aired. 281 On the contrary, the public has a First Amendment inter­
est in having such views available and the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, is paramount. 282 In 
275. 395 U.S. at 392. 
276. 287 So. 2d 78, 82 (Fla. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
277. 418 U.S. at 256. 
278. See note 256 supra and accompanying text. 
279. 418 U.S. at 257. 
280. 395 U.S. at 393. The Court noted that if this became a problem, however, 
"the Commission is not powerless to insist that [broadcasters] give adequate and fair 
attention to public issues." Id. Assuming that is true, it is admittedly one additional 
distinguishing feature between Red Lion and Tornillo, since there is no governmen­
tal power that can require newspapers to do the same. 
281. Id. at 389. 
282. Id. at 390. This view parallels that expressed by the FCC in its initial an­
nouncement of the Fairness Doctrine: 
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Tornillo, it was similarly argued that the claim of newspapers had a 
role to playas surrogates for the public, but that newspapers had a 
fiduciary obligation to account for that stewardship. Further, in 
view of the monopolies controlled by the owners of most newspa­
pers, it was argued that affirmative government action was re­
quired as the "only effective way to insure fairness and accuracy 
and to provide for some accountability. "283 The Burger Court re­
jected this argument, opining that press responsibility, while desir­
able, was neither mandated by the Constitution nor capable of be­
ing legislated. 284 Moreover, the Court contended that the 
affirmative governmental action urged by proponents of access 
would require an invasion of the exercise of editorial control and 
judgment, which exercise, the Court found, could not be con­
ducted consistently with the First Amendment. 285 
Despite various attempts to reconcile Red Lion and Tor­
nillo,286 they fundamentally conflict. Red Lion adopts a series of 
policy arguments that appear sound as a matter of practicality, 
while Tornillo rejects these same arguments, perhaps in the face of 
even more persuasive factual evidence, in favor of equally sound 
and perhaps more compelling constitutional principles. If these 
principles override the practical aspects of the newspaper industry, 
they should do so with respect to the broadcast industry as well; if 
they do not, it is because of the "uniqueness" of the broadcast me­
dia, a concept often alluded to but never sufficiently explained. 287 
In any event, if the Burger Court intended that its constitutional 
reasoning in Tornillo should not apply to broadcasting, it could 
have, and should have, said so and explained the relationship be-
It is this right of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part 
of the Government, any broadcast licensee or any individual member of the 
public to broadcast his own particular views on any matter, which is the 
foundation stone of the American system of broadcasting. 
FCC, Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949). 
283. 418 U.S. at 251. 
284. Id. at 256. 
285. Id. at 258. 
286. See, e.g., Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of 
Media Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 563 (1976). 
287. Red Lion describes broadcasting as a "unique medium," on the basis that 
"there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are fre­
quencies to allocate." Id. at 388 & 390. But the fact is that in virtually every market 
of any size there are today far more broadcasting facilities than daily newspapers. 
And, as the Burger Court pointed out in Tornillo, economic considerations make it as 
difficult today to successfully publish a new daily newspaper as economic and tech­
nical considerations make it difficult to open a new broadcast facility. 
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tween Tornillo and Red Lion that it intended. As it stands, Tornillo 
invites the broadcasting industry to request a review of the Red 
Lion opinion. This invitation, it is hoped, will be quickly accepted. 
B. Searches of Newspaper Property 
On April 8, 1971, demonstrators occupied the administrative 
offices of the Stanford University Hospital. The next day police 
were called in to remove them. Demonstrators armed with sticks 
and clubs attacked a group of nine policemen, breaking one police­
man's shoulder and injuring the other eight. The Stanford Daily, 
the student-run campus newspaper, published a special edition on 
the incident, including photographs. The district attorney's office 
obtained a warrant to search the Daily's offices for any prints or 
negatives that might help identify those who assaulted the police. 
Officers searched through filing cabinets, desks and wastebaskets 
but found no pictures except those already published in the Daily. 
The Daily challenged the constitutionality of the search by 
suing the policemen, the district attorney and others for violating 
its federal civil rights under the First and Fourth Amendments. Al­
though the newspaper won in both the trial court288 and the court 
of appeals,289 the Supreme Court reversed in Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily,290 holding against the newspaper on both its constitutional 
arguments. 
The Fourth Amendment declares inviolate "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures," and says that search 
warrants shall issue only "upon probable cause. "291 The Stanford 
Daily argued thereunder that an unannounced search for criminal 
evidence at the premises of a party not itself suspected of a crime 
was legal only if the person may otherwise destroy the evidence. 
Absent probable cause to believe that the Daily or its staff were 
implicated in the assault on the police, the officials who wanted the 
288. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afI'd, 550 
F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The district court denied the 
newspaper's request for an injunction, but, upon the Daily's motion for summary 
judgment, granted declaratory relief. 
289. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 
547 (1978). 
290. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The five Justice majority opinion was written by Just­
ice White. Justice Powell joined in the majority opinion but filed a separate concur­
ring opinion. Justices Stewart, Marshall and Stevens dissented, while Justice 
Brennan took no part in the decision. 
291. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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photographs should have, in the newspaper's view, proceeded by a 
subpoena, which, unlike a search warrant, would have given the 
Daily prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme 
Court characterized that argument as a remarkable, sweeping revi­
sion of the Fourth Amendment because the amendment made no 
distinction between criminal suspects and others as possessors of 
material sought for purposes of law enforcement. 292 
On the First Amendment issue, the newspaper argued that 
the official intrusion into a newsroom without notice or a chance to 
object presented an extremely grave violation of press freedoms. It 
posited a "chilling" of the whole editorial process from the fear of 
scrutiny by the state and contended that searches might disclose 
confidential sources as well. The majority of the Supreme Court 
found these claims unconvincing. Justice White's opinion said that 
because the framers of the Constitution did not make any special 
provision for the press when drafting the Fourth Amendment, they 
must have thought that the general rules of reasonableness and 
probable cause sufficiently protected the press. 293 Nor was the ma­
jority persuaded that press sources would dry Up.294 Finally, it 
found no reason to believe that magistrates, who issue the majority 
of warrants, could not guard against unduly intrusive searches of 
newspapers. 295 
Not every Justice was unpersuaded by the newspaper's First 
Amendment arguments, however. Justice Stewart, joined by Just­
ice Marshall, filed a strong dissenting opinion. 296 He stated: "po­
lice searches of newspaper offices burden the freedom of the press. 
. . . [and] will inevitably interrupt its normal operations, and thus 
impair or even temporarily prevent the processes of newsgather­
ing, writing, editing, and publishing."297 He. also argued that an 
unannounced police search of a newspaper office could have a chill­
ing effect on information received from confidential sources. Those 
292. 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978). This decision followed the expansive view of the 
Fourth Amendment taken by the Warren Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 
(1967), which abandoned an earlier doctrine prohibiting search warrants for "mere 
evidence," as opposed to instrumentalities, contraband or fruits of crime. 
293. 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978). 
294. [d. at 566. The majority found in any event that "[wlhatever incremental 
effect there may be in this regard if search warrants, as well as subpoenas, are per­
missible in proper circumstances, it does not make a constitutional difference in our 
judgment." Id. 
295. [d. 
296. 436 U.S. 547, 571-73 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
297. Id. at 571. 
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sources need protection to ensure that the press can fulfill its con­
stitutionally designated function of informing the public. Important 
information can often be obtained only by an assurance that the 
source will not be revealed. 
He said that a search warrant allows police officers to read 
each and every document in a newspaper's files until they have 
found the one named in the warrant. Therefore, it would be possi­
ble to have needless exposure of confidential information com­
pletely unrelated to the purpose of the investigation. Conse­
quently, confidential news sources will dry up. The end result 
would be a diminishing flow of potentially important information to 
the public. 298 
The media swiftly reacted to the Stanford Daily decision with 
predictable outrage. Benjamin Bradlee expressly opposed it. 299 
Allen Neuharth, president of the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association and of Gannett Newspapers, said that the decision put 
"a sledgehammer in the hands of those who would batter the 
American people's First Amendment rights.... It literally and le­
gally picks the lock that protects the exercise of a free press . 
. . . "300 Walter Cronkite predicted the potential results of the deci­
sion: "[A] warrant is signed by a judge, who [frequently] owes his 
election to the [local] political machine. . . . [S]ources dry up, 
scandal dies, and the political machine is free. . . . "301 Perhaps 
the most impassioned reaction came from Howard K. Smith who 
analogized this to an experience he had as a new young reporter at 
the United Press in Nazi Berlin when fifteen Gestapo men knocked 
at his door, barged past him, began opening every desk and for six 
hours studied every piece of paper they could find. 302 
Others, like Anthony Lewis, a Lecturer on Law at Harvard 
Law School and a columnist for The New York Times, expressed as 
much alarm to the press' reaction as to the decision. Unpersuaded 
by the Stanford Daily's argument that the First Amendment ac­
corded the press special protection against search warrants, Mr. 
Lewis chastised the media for narrow-mindedness in their reactions 
to the Supreme Court's decision. The real danger in the Stanford 
Daily case, he said, lay in the magnitude of the search and its in­
298. Id. at 571-72. 
299. Leading Media Figures Attack Police Raid Ruling, 2 THE NEWS MEDIA & 
THE LAW 4 (1978). 
300. Id. 
301. Id. 
302. [d. 
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trusive quality. Persons who are not themselves suspected of any 
crime but are thought to have evidence could be harmed. Doctors, 
lawyers and others, Mr. Lewis pointed out, may fear unreasonably 
intrusive police searches through their files. 303 
The lower courts did not hesitate to apply the Stanford Daily 
decision in other contexts. On August 11, 1978, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the federal 
government could subpoena telephone company records of a jour­
nalist's long distance telephone calls and could review those re­
cords without providing any prior notice. The court reasoned that 
government access to third-party evidence in the course of a good 
faith felony investigation in no sense abridged news gathering and 
placed no burden on journalists except "mere inconvenience. "304 
A number of state and federal legislators have introduced leg­
islation to nullify the Stanford Daily decision. Some of the pro­
posed legislation would protect the press only from third-party 
search warrants in which the subject of the search warrant is not it­
self suspected of a crime and there is no probable cause to believe 
that evidence would be destroyed if a search warrant did not issue. 
Other proposed legislation adopts the concerns expressed by Mr. 
Lewis and would prohibit the issuance of a search warrant against 
anyone not suspected of having committed a crime. 
Interestingly, the first state to enact protective legislation after 
the Stanford Daily decision was California. On September 23, 
1978, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., signed a bill that included 
an amendment extending the state's shield law to prohibit news­
room searches. That enactment applies strictly to media and media 
personnel. 305 
The Carter Administration, in December 1978, proposed a 
new law to protect reporters, scholars and their sources from 
303. Czerniejewski, Your Newsroom May Be Searched, The Quill, July-Aug. 
1978, 21, 24-25; see also Lewis, Comment, 30 Harv. L. Sch. Bull. No.1, 5, 7-8 (1978). 
304. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978). 
305. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending id. 
§ 1524 (West 1972)) prohibits the issuance of a warrant for any item described in 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending id. § 1070 (West 1965)), 
the California reporters' "shield" law. Eight states have passed legislation geared to­
ward overturning the results reached in Stanford. They are: California, Connecticut, 
Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin. See CAL. EVID. CODE 
§ 1070 (West 1979); 1979 Conn. Pub. Acts 79-14 § 1; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 108-3 
(1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-813 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A;84A-21.9 (West 1979); 
1979 Or. Laws ch. 820; CRIM. PROC. ANN. TEX. CODE art. 18.01(e) (Vernon 1980); 
1979 Wis. Laws ch. 81. 
647 1980] MEDIA LAW PERSPECTIVE 
searches by federal, state and local law enforcement officers. The 
Administration's proposal would prohibit law enforcement officers 
from searching the notes, photographs and other "work product" of 
reporters, scholars and others who disseminate information to the 
public. The only exceptions would arise where a search was 
deemed necessary to prevent serious injury to an individual, or 
where the person possessing protected material was believed to 
have committed a crime for which the material would be evidence. 
The proposal would extend protection to those who have gathered 
information with the intention of making it available for publication 
or broadcast. 306 None of this legislation has, as yet, been enacted. 
C. Protection of Confidential Sources 
In Stanford Daily, 307 the majority referred to its decision in 
Branzhurg and dismissed the newspaper's argument that confiden­
tial sources might "dry up" if they had reason to fear warranted 
searches of newspaper offices by the police. The Branzhurg deci­
sion308 involved a group of cases in which reporters had been sub­
poenaed by grand juries to testifY about criminal activities they had 
witnessed or learned of from confidential news sources during the 
course of investigations for news stories. Each reporter claimed a 
qualified privilege not to appear or to testifY before a grand jury 
until and unless sufficient grounds were shown for believing that: 
(1) The journalist possesses information relevant to a crime under 
investigation by the grand jury; (2) the information the journalist 
has is unavailable from other sources; and (3) "the need for the in­
formation is sufficiently compelling to override the ... invasion of 
First Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure."309 The 
privilege was necessary, the reporters asserted, because informants 
would become reluctant to provide newsworthy information if jour­
nalists were forced to respond to subpoenas and to identifY their 
sources or to disclose other confidences. This, they argued, would 
place an unconstitutional burden on news gathering. 
A clear majority of the Court found that the reporters lacked 
any privilege not to appear before the grand juries. 310 The plurality 
306. Carter Proposes Law to Shield Reporters, Others From Search, Wall St. J., 
Dec. 14, 1978, at 45, col. 4. 
307. 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978). 
308. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
309. ld. at 680. 
310. Justice White wrote a plurality opinion joined by three other Justices, 
including the Chief Justice, which concluded that reporters shared the obligation of 
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opinion of four failed to identify any constitutional basis for a re­
porter's privilege of any sort not to testify. In sum, the plurality 
found: 
On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding 
that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring ef­
fective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the con­
sequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said 
to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, re­
spond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid 
jury investigation or criminal trial. 311 
The plurality further rejected the asserted qualified reporter's priv­
ilege on the grounds of a lack of efficacy312 and problems that 
would arise in judicial administration. 313 
In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that journalists ought to en­
joy not a qualified but an absolute privilege not to appear or testify 
before a grand jury concerning their sources or professional ob­
servations.314 Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, also in dissent, urged adoption of a qualified privilege 
not to testify, abridgeable only upon a showing of relevance, ex­
haustion of alternate sources and a "compelling and overriding in­
terest in the information. "315 These dissenters believed that no 
such showing had been made in these cases. 
Thus, it was left to Justice Powell to break a four-to-four tie. 
He did so by voting that the reporters in these cases must appear 
and testify, while apparently refusing to join the plurality's rejec­
tion of any qualified privilege. Justice Powell argued that the plu­
rality's opinion required only that a "proper balance" be struck be­
tween First Amendment rights and a citizen's obligation to give 
relevant testimony in criminal matters. Specifically, he said that 
the plurality's decision left open the possibility of a motion to 
all citizens to appear and testify before grand juries when subpoenaed. 408 U.S. 665 
(1972). Justice Powell, concurring, added the fifth vote on the appearance issue 
when he said that the "newsman witness, like all other witnesses, will have to ap­
pear...." 408 U.S. at 710. 
311. Id. at 690-91. 
312. "If newsmen's confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed to 
be, the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines the situation 
justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem. For them, it would appear 
that only an absolute privilege would suffice." 408 U.S. at 702 (footnote omitted). 
313. Id. at 703-05. 
314. "[T]here is no 'compelling need' that can be shown which qualifies the 
reporter's immunity from appearing or testifying before a grand jury, unless the re­
porter himself is implicated in a crime." [d. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
315. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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quash and the entry of "an appropriate protective order" if first, 
the grand jury's investigation is not being conducted in good faith 
or the purpose of the subpoena is merely harassment of the press, 
second, the information sought from the reporter bears "only a 
remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investiga­
tion," or third, the journalist's testimony would implicate "con­
fidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law en-
r '~16IOrcement.... 
Thus, Justice Powell's substantive formulation of a qualified re­
porter's privilege not to testify in grand jury proceedings did not 
differ markedly from that urged by Justices Stewart, Brennan and 
Marshall; Justice Powell did part company with the other three on 
the burden of proof. He viewed the dissenters' requirement that 
no reporter be compelled to testify before a grand jury and to re­
veal confidential sources until the government has proven clear rel­
evance, no alternative sources and a compelling and overriding in­
terest as an unnecessarily heavy burden for the government to 
bear. Instead, he preferred to leave the courts free to balance the 
competing interests on an ad hoc basis. 317 
Journalists, and their lawyers, have tended to read Branzburg 
as establishing a qualified privilege not to testify in criminal mat­
ters, at least where they could convince the court that, on balance, 
the government's need for the information did not outweigh their 
First Amendment rights. Some courts have read Branzburg the 
same way. In Brown v. Commonwealth,318 for example, the 
Virginia Supreme Court held that a journalist need not reveal his 
identified source's confidential statements where it has not been 
shown that the information was essential or relevant to the case. 
The decision was premised on the Virginia court's determination 
that a journalist's privilege of confidentiality yields only in cases in 
which his information is relevant, essential to a fair trial and not 
otherwise available. A similar result was reached in State v. St. 
Peter319 by the Vermont Supreme Court. 320 
316. [d. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
317. [d. at 710. 
318. 214 Va. 755, 757, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431, Gert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974). 
319. 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974). 
320. For similar adaptations of a qualified reporter's privilege along the lines of 
Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg see also United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 
229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), afi'd, 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.), Gert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); 
Laughlin v. State, 323 So. 2d 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Sandstrom, 224 
Kan. 573, 581 P.2d 812 (1978), Gert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979); People v. Monroe, 
82 Misc. 2d 850, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). 
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Other courts, however, have seen Branzburg as a rejection of 
any privilege for journalists in criminal proceedings. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, for example, has declined 
to rule that journalists have a qualified privilege to refuse to reveal 
confidential information relevant to a court proceeding, deciding 
instead that the First Amendment imports neither a qualified or 
absolute privilege.321 More directly, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has expressly declined to read Justice Powell's concurring 
opinion in Branzburg as a fifth vote for a qualified privilege. In re 
Farber,322 the court, seeing no disagreement between Justice 
Powell's concurrence and the Branzburg plurality opinion, found 
that five United States Supreme Court members concluded that 
the First Amendment affords no privilege to a newsman to refuse 
to testify before a grand jury about relevant information he pos­
sesses, even though doing so may divulge confidential sources. The 
court specifically eschewed any responsibility on its part to weigh 
or to balance conflicting interests in the issue because, in its view, 
a higher court performed the weighing and balancing. 323 
Farber illustrates the confusion left in the wake of Branzburg. 
Although refusing to find a qualified reporter's privilege not to pro­
vide confidential information pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum 
of a criminal defendant, the majority in Farber nevertheless held 
the journalist entitled to a full hearing on the issues of relevance, 
materiality and overbreadth; the decision rested on New Jersey's 
News Media Privilege Act,324 a "shield law" intended to "protect 
the confidentiality and secrecy of sources from which the media de­
rive information. "325 The "shield law" required such a hearing, the 
majority said, even though both the Sixth Amendment's and the 
New Jersey Constitution's provisions guaranteeing an accused's 
321. Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847, 849 
(1973). It appears, however, that even Massachusetts requires that the inquiries 
made of journalists be "relevant and reasonable." [d. at 321, 303 N.E.2d at 849. 
There is no requirement in Massachusetts, however, that there be no other source 
for the information sought or that there be a compelling need for it. Although Dow 
Jones was a libel case involving the subpoenaed journalist's publication, the decision 
therein was based on a previous Massachusetts decision involving a subpoena to ap­
pear and testify before a grand jury, which was afforded in the Branzburg decisions. 
In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), afi'd, sub nom. Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
322. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). 
323. 78 N.J. at 268, 394 A.2d at 334. 
324. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1976). 
325. 78 N.J. at 276, 394 A.2d at 338. 
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right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses "prevails" 
over the statute. 326 
One of the dissenters in Farber, Justice Handler, agreed with 
the majority that journalists do not have a First Amendment privi­
lege to refuse to provide confidential information but nevertheless 
argued that the reporter's conduct in obtaining and recounting 
news is entitled to constitutional protection. The reporter's pursuit 
and presentation of news should not needlessly be hobbled. 327 De­
spite his rejection of even a qualified privilege, Justice Handler 
was unwilling to sustain the reporter's contempt citation because 
the record below did not establish the relevance and necessity of 
the reporter's information. 
The Farber opinions, then, sharply focus how Branzburg fails 
to guide lower courts in reporters' privilege cases. Farber also 
illustrates how far demands on journalists' information have come 
since Branzburg. Whereas the reporters involved in the cases de­
cided in Branzburg were asked by a grand jury to provide, essen­
tially, only the names of one or a few confidential sources, the re­
porter in Farber had to produce, pursuant to the defendant's 
subpoena duces tecum, more than 5,000 documents, including all 
his notes. For refusing to do so, the journalist spent forty days in 
jail, and his newspaper paid $285,000 in fines on contempt char­
328ges.
Branzburg has also left a controversy as to its applicability to 
civil cases. Although generally reluctant to require nonparty jour­
nalists to reveal confidential sources or information obtained there­
from in civil cases,329 the courts have done so, where the informa­
tion sought was necessary to the case, other means of obtaining the 
information were exhausted, and the subpoenaing party's position 
was not patently frivolous. 33o The courts have more willingly 
compelled journalists to reveal their sources and other confidential 
326. Id. at 274, 394 A.2d at 337. The majority held that the required hearing 
had taken place and that the record below was sufficient to require the journalist to 
comply with the subpoena and to support his contempt citation for refusing to com­
ply. Id. at 277, 394 A.2d at 339. 
327. Id. at 300, 394 A.2d at 350 (Handler, J., dissenting). 
328. The press after Farber, The Quill, March 1979, at 22. 
329. See, e.g., Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 
1973); Baker v. F & F Inv., 339 F. s.upp. 942 (S.D. N.Y.), afi'd, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 
1972), cen. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973). 
330. Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977), cen. denied, 436 U.S. 
905 (1978). 
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information where the journalist or his employer is a libel defend­
ant; but even there some showing has generally been required that 
the information is relevant and goes to the heart of the case, other 
sources have been exhausted, and the plaintiff's suit is not frivo­
lous. 331 A notable exception to such a requirement, as we have 
seen, is Massachusetts. 332 So far, the Burger Court has declined to 
consider the issue of the reporter's privilege in civil cases, except 
to the extent that it was touched upon in Herbert v. Lando,333 dis­
cussed immediately below. 
The case law of the journalists' privilege remains in complete 
disarray, complicated further by passage of various state "shield 
laws," often designed to provide protection to the media after 
Branzburg. While such laws have afforded some protection for 
journalists,334 they have also been narrowly construed335 and, in at 
least one case,336 have been declared unconstitutional. 
Most state and federal courts forced to wrestle with Branzburg 
have explicitly or implicitly recognized some kind of qualified privi­
lege in most circumstances, some requiring a showing of need on 
the part of the party requesting the information, some performing 
a balancing test. The wheels of justice have not ground to a halt, at 
least not for this reason. It is accordingly hoped that the Burger 
Court will take an early opportunity to rethink Branzburg and to 
recognize some kind of qualified privilege of its own. At the very 
least, in view of the obvious need for prompt clarification of this 
entire area, it should endeavor to create order out of the chaos its 
decision has caused. 
331. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cerl. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Goldfeld v. Post Publishing, 4 MED. L. RPTR. 1167 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1978); cf. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 91 N.M. 250, 
572 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App.), cerl. denied, 91 N.M. 249, 572 P.2d 1257 (1977), cerl. 
denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978) (remanding with instructions that an in camera proceed­
ing be held to determine the veracity of informants' reports). 
332. Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 
(1973). See also Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Ida. 288, 562 P.2d 791, cerl. 
denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977) (similarly finding no privilege not to testify in either the 
civil or criminal context). 
333. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
334. See, e.g., JenofTv. Hearst Corp., 3 MED. L. RPTR. 1911 (D. Md. 1978). 
335. See, e.g., In re Investigative File, 4 MED. L. RPTR. 1865 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 
1978) ("shield law" applies only to an individual reporter and not to his employer); 
New York v. Le Grand, 4 MED. L. RPTR. 1897 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) ("shield law" 
does not apply to authors of books). 
336. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 
(1976) (statutory privilege relating to news sources and information violates state 
constitutional provision vesting in the supreme court exclusive power to prescribe 
rules of evidence and procedure). 
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D. Protection ofJournalists' Thoughts 
In Herbert337 the Burger Court rejected the claim of a media 
libel defendant of a First Amendment privilege not to disclose dur­
ing discovery matters relating to his state of mind prior to publica­
tion of the alleged libel and to the editorial process that preceded 
publication. The case involved a libel action filed by former Army 
Colonel Anthony Herbert, who had received considerable attention 
in 1969-70 after accusing his superior officers of covering up re­
ports of atrocities and other war crimes in Vietnam. CBS broad­
casted a report on Herbert and his accusations on February 4, 
1973, in a 60 Minutes segment that Herbert claimed defamed him 
and portrayed him as a liar. The program was produced and edited 
by Barry Lando, who later published a related article in Atlantic 
Monthly magazine. 
Herbert conceded that he was a "public figure" for purposes of 
the action, which meant that he could not prevail without a show­
ing that the publication about him was published with actual mal­
ice, which is with knowledge that it was false or with reckless dis­
regard of whether it was false or not. 338 Absent a showing of a 
knowing falsehood, the public figure libel plaintiff must prove that 
the media defendant acted recklessly or entertained serious doubts 
about the truth of his publication. 339 
In an effort to establish actual malice, Herbert deposed Lando 
and, inter alia, asked a number of questions relating to Lando's 
personal conclusions during his research and investigations regard­
ing people or leads to pursue or to ignore prior to publication, 
Lando's prepublication conclusions about the veracity of various 
in terviewees and the truth of the facts they had provided, Lando's 
conversations with his colleagues about matters to include or to ex­
clude from the broadcast, and Lando's "intentions as manifested by 
his decision to include or exclude certain material. "340 Lando re­
fused to answer Herbert's questions in these areas on the ground 
that the First Amendment precluded "inquiry into' the state of 
mind of those who edit, produce, or publish, and precluded in­
337. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
338. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (announcing the 
"actual malice" requirement in the context of a libel action by a public official); see 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending the requirement to li­
bel actions by "public figures"). See text accompanying notes 354-450 infra. 
339. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 732 (1968). 
340. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 983 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 
(1979). 
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quiry into the editorial process. "341 The trial court disagreed,342 
but, on interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held, two-to-one, such matters constitution­
ally privileged. 343 
The Burger Court, in an opinion written by Justice White, re­
versed the Second Circuit and refused to recognize the evidentiary 
privilege urged by Lando. The thrust of Justice White's reasoning 
was that the thoughts and editorial processes of the alleged de­
famer must be open to examination in order to prove liability.344 
The majority viewed the actual malice requirement as a balance 
struck between the protection of press freedoms (by requiring pub­
lic figure libel plaintiffs to prove knowing or reckless falsehood) and 
the protection of the individual's interest in his reputation (by 
permitting public figure plaintiffs to recover in libel cases upon a 
showing of actual malice). It saw no reason to upset this balance by 
holding that public figure libel plaintiffs could be barred from es­
tablishing reckless disregard of the truth with direct evidence ob­
tained through inquiry into the thoughts, opinions and conclusions 
of the publisher. Inasmuch as actual malice must be proven with 
convincing clarity,345 the majority felt that restricting plaintiffs' 
proof to "objective evidence from which the ultimate fact could be 
inferred" would be untenable. 346 
Two dissenting Justices, Brennan347 and Marshall,348 argued 
in favor of some kind of editorial privilege while Justice Stewart 
dissented with the argument, that, constitutional privilege or no, 
the material sought by Herbert was irrelevant as a matter of proce­
dural law when the actual malice test is read properly. 349 
The attention Colonel Herbert received when he levelled his 
charges paled by comparison to the attention his Supreme Court 
victory received. Media condemnation was prompt. 350 Yet Profes­
341. 441 U.S. at 157 (footnote omitted). 
342. 73 F.R.D. 387, 395 (S.D. N.Y. 1977). 
343. 568 F.2d at 984. 
344. 441 U.S. at 160. 
345. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964). 
346. 441 U.S. at 170. 
347. Id. at 180-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). 
348. Id. at 202-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
349. Id. at 199-202 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
350. The chairman of the Washington based Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of the Press, for example, called the decision a " 'major defeat for the First Amend­
ment.''' Brandon, Probing of journalists' 'state of mind' is permissible, Supreme 
Court holds, Publishers' Auxiliary, Apr. 23, 1979, at 1. Even before the decision, 
Publishers' Auxiliary editorialized: "Those who do not agree with the [Second Cir­
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sor Marc Franklin has described the Herbert decision as an adher­
ence to the Court's prior decisions and to the way lawyers had uni­
versally conducted such litigation. He intimates that the Supreme 
Court considered the issue raised by the case only to correct the 
"aberrational stance" of the Second Circuit. 351 The attention and 
shrill reactions given to Herbert, Franklin suggests, derived from 
the media's attaching too much importance to it solely because it 
was a media case, their inability to recognize the infirmities of the 
Second Circuit's opinion that should have warned them of an im­
pending reversal, and their failure to "distinguish between cases in 
which the Court has withdrawn an existing protection from the 
press and those in which novel media theories have been re­
jected. "352 Viewed in a proper light, he argues, Herbert signifies 
little except what the reactions to it teach us about the relationship 
between the press and the legal profession. 353 
The media may well have done themselves, and their lawyers, 
a disservice by spreading the idea in the public, and among plain­
tiffs' lawyers and judges who have not read the decision, that 
Herbert represented a startling and alarming new development 
that armed libel plaintiffs with weapons they never had before. To 
Professor Franklin's list of reasons for the media's overreaction, 
cuit] appeals court's opinion don't want a free press. They want a subservient press." 
Herbert v. Lando, Publishers' Auxiliary, Nov. 13, 1978, at 6. 
351. Franklin, Reflections on Herbert v. Lando, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1042 
(1979). 
352. ld. at 1051. 
353. Professor Franklin's colleague, Professor Jack H. Friedenthal, believes 
that Herbert may prove to have some troubling significance in the area of pretrial 
discovery in civil cases. Professor Friedenthal is concerned that certain remarks by 
the majority, to the effect that federal trial judges should not "neglect their power to 
restrict discovery," 441 U.S. at 177, coupled with separate remarks by Justices 
Powell and Marshall, "could be read to convey the vague impression that the Court 
has now narrowed the traditional scope of discovery" by intimating that" 'relevancy' 
for discovery purposes is dependent to some extent on a balance between the need 
for information and the substantive harm resulting from disclosure." In particular, 
Professor Friedenthal viewed with some alarm Justice Powell's "position that rele­
vance for discovery purposes in defamation cases should be determined not by 
whether information mayor may not lead to admissible evidence, but by whether, 
on balance, the need for the information sought outweighs the danger that such dis­
covery will interfere with the public interest in maintaining a 'free flow of news and 
commentary:" 441 U.S. at 179-80 (Powell, J., concurring), and Justice MarshalJ'd 
"closely analogous position with regard to discovery of information outside the scope 
of the very narrow constitutional privilege he would impose." Professor Friedenthal 
could find "little justification and must potential harm" in such a balancing approach 
to relevancy in pretrial discovery. Friedenthal, Herbert v. Lando: A Note on Discov­
ery, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1061, 1062 (1979). 
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however, one can add the paranoia that the various anti-press cases 
collected in this article have created in the media. If Herbert had 
been but a single raindrop falling from an otherwise sunny sky, it 
no doubt would not have received the media outcry that it did. 
But as one in a series of drops deftly administered in the classic 
water torture, it produced automatic cries of anguish disproportion­
ate to the pain it produced itself. Standing alone, however, 
Herbert is "unr~markable," both because it plows no new ground 
and because it retains a sensible balance of the interests involved 
in public figure media libel cases. 
The media may take some perverted comfort, however, in one 
thing: It appears that Herbert will apply to a relatively small num­
ber of cases because, as shown in part V, the Burger Court has 
drastically reduced the number of libel plaintiffs having to prove 
"actual malice." 
V. LIBEL-THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE 
The Burger and Warren Courts' respective approaches to the 
concept of a constitutional privilege in libel cases involving media 
defendants present a striking contrast. While the Warren Court in­
itiated and consistently expanded the notion that certain constitu­
tional protections pertain to the media in defamation cases, the 
Burger Court has seized virtually every available opportunity to 
constrict these constitutional protections, denying they exist in all 
but the most extreme cases. 
Prior to 1964, libelous statements generally were viewed as 
beyond the scope of the First Amendment, enjoying no constitu­
tional protection regardless of the speaker's status. In 1942, Justice 
Murphy summarized the prevailing wisdom in his oft-quoted 
passage from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire: 354 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include 
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insult­
ing or "fighting" words .... It has been well observed that such 
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and 
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit 
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the so­
cial interest in order and morality. 355 
354. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
355. Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
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Through its landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,356 the Warren Court endeavored to put an end to that 
view as it applied to libelous statements by the media. Sullivan in­
volved a libel action brought by the police commissioner of 
Montgomery, Alabama, against The New York Times and others 
arising from an .advertisement appearing in the Times. The adver­
tisement, placed by a prominent civil rights organization, attacked 
police practices in Alabama and solicited contributions for the or­
ganization's programs. Certain statements in the advertisement 
referring to the police commissioner's performance of his official 
duties contained minor factual errors. The Alabama Supreme Court 
affirmed a jury verdict for the police commissioner, stating that li­
belous publications are not protected by the First Amendment. 357 
The Warren Court, through Justice Brennan, reversed, declaring 
that libel actions against the press must be judged by standards 
that satisfy the First Amendment. 358 The majority opinion con­
cluded that a public official is prohibited from recovering damages 
from the media for defamatory falsehoods relating to official con­
duct unless he can prove that the statement was made with actual 
malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard as to whether it was false. 359 Justice Brennan viewed this 
conclusion as being consistent with a "background of a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. "360 That commit­
ment, he said, must protect even erroneous statements if freedom 
of expression is to have the "breathing space" it requires. 361 
While the holding of Sullivan was limited to defamation ac­
tions by public officials against the media for statements relating to 
official conduct, its implications were enormous. For. the first time, 
libel judgments against the media, at least in certain circum­
stances, were required to meet some constitutional standards. The 
most remarkable aspect of the Sullivan decision, in view of what 
356. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); 
357. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 676, 144 So. 2d 25, 40 
(1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 254, 256-58 (1964). 
358. 376 U.S. at 269. 
359. ld. at 279-80. Moreover, such actual malice must be established with con­
vincing clarity. ld. at 285-86. The Court later explained that reckless disregard for 
the truth requires at least sufficient evidence that the defendant in fact entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of his ·publication. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 
727, 731 (1968). 
360. 376 U.S. at 270. 
361. ld. at 272. 
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has since taken place, is that the only dispute among the Justices 
was whether the constitutional privilege recognized therein was 
qualified or absolute; there was no question that some constitu­
tional protection existed. Moreover, the Warren Court wasted little 
time in expanding the new Sullivan doctrine to other contexts. The 
Court extended its constitutional analysis to cases involving crimi­
nal libel,362 appointed public official plaintiffs,363 public figure 
plaintiffs364 and candidates for public office. 365 
Sullivan declined to determine how low in the government hi­
erarchy the public official designation would extend, leaving open 
the question of which officials trigger application of the actual mal­
ice standard. 366 Later decisions of the Warren Court, however, left 
a clear impression that constitutional protection of the media in 
cases involving public officials or public figures required broad con­
struction of those classifications. As a result, the constitutional priv­
ilege came to be extended to actions by such public officials as school 
teachers,367 school principals,368 auditors of municipal utilities, 369 
police officers,370 court-appointed attorneys for indigents,371 county 
motor pool administrators,372 social workers,373 and companies 
with government contracts. 374 Similarly, the category of public fig­
ures has been held to include Nobel Prize winners,375 businessmen 
who hold political party offices,376 college athletic coaches,377 per­
362. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
363. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
364. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Public figures were 
defined as persons who were not public officials but who commanded substantial in­
dependent public interest at the time of publication. Id. at 154. 
365. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971). 
366. 376 U.S. at 283 n.23. 
367. Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1978). 
368. Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1967). 
369. Kruteck v. Schimmel, 27 App. Div. 2d 837, 278 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1967). 
370. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 
279 (1971); Suchomel v. Suburban Life Newspapers, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 2d 239, 228 
N.E.2d 172 (1967). 
371. Steere v. Cupp., 4 MED. L. RPTR. 1138 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 1978). 
372. Clawson v. Longview Publishing Co., 91 Wash. 2d 408, 589 P.2d 1223 
(1979). 
373. Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn. 1978). 
374. Artic Co. v. Loudoun Times Mirror, 4 MED. L. RPTR. 1947 (E.D. Va. 
1978). 
375. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967). 
376. News Journal Co. v. Gallagher, 233 A.2d 166 (Del. 1967). 
377. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. 
Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (former professional basketball player cur­
rently engaged in coaching). 
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sons claiming to have cures for maladies,378 former Playboy play­
mates,379 the sons of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg,380 persons with 
alleged ties to organized crime,381 and prominent dabblers in state 
politics. 382 
The scope of constitutional protection for libelous statements 
by the media reached its apparent pinnacle in 1971 with the plural­
ity opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 383 the first signifi­
cant media libel case to be decided by the Supreme Court under 
Chief Justice Burger. Rosenbloom stood, for a time, for the propo­
sition that purportedly libelous statements by the media concern­
ing matters of general or public interest enjoyed constitutional pro­
tection subject to the Sullivan actual malice test of liability 
regardless of the plaintiff's status. The plurality of three Justices384 
felt that the plaintiff's status bore little relation to the values pro­
tected by the First Amendment and that media discussions of mat­
ters of public concern should be protected even when they in­
volved little known persons. The two other Justices comprising the 
majority concurred in the result for very different reasons. 38S Jus­
tices Harlan, Stewart and Marshall dissented from the plurality 
opinion on the ground that the public interest test was un­
workable. 
By 1974, following the appointments of Justices Powell and 
Rehnquist, the balance of opinion with respect to the scope of con­
stitutional protection in media libel cases had clearly shifted. If 
Rosenbloom stood at the summit, the climb down began with 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,386 in which three significant develop­
ments occurred. First, the majority explicitly rejected the plurality 
view in Rosenbloom that media statements concerning matters of 
public or general interest were entitled to Sullivan protection re­
gardless of the plaintiff's status. The constitutional privilege an­
378. Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 366 F. Supp. 154 (D. Mont. 1973). 
379. Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211 (1978). 
380. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977). 

38l. Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976). 

382. Whitaker v. Denver Post, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 60 (1975), "~1?e,.sed sub nom. 
Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977). 
·383. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
384. The three Justices were Justice Brennan, author of the opinion, Chief Jus­
tice Burger and Justice Blackmun. 
385. Justice Black maintained his position that the Constitution permits no lia­
bility for defamation in any case. Id. at 57. Justice White felt that it was not neces­
sary to reach the plurality's view because, in his mind, the ·plaintiff in Rosenbloom 
was a public official. Id. at 59. Justice Douglas did not participate in the decision. 
386. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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nounced in Sullivan was held to apply only in cases involving a 
public official or public figure plaintiff. 
Second, the Court began a process it has since pursued with 
relish: greatly limiting the scope of those two categories so that 
fewer and fewer libel plaintiffs will fit into them. Public figures, 
the Gertz majority said, are of two kinds: (1) persons with such 
"pervasive fame or notoriety" that they may be considered public 
figures for all purposes; and (2) persons who have thrust them­
selves into the vortex of some specific public controversy, thus be­
coming public figures for a limited range of issues. 387 The plaintiff 
in Gertz, a prominent Chicago attorney long active in community 
and professional affairs and a publisher of several books and articles 
on legal subjects,388 was found to fit under neither of those 
standards. (In sharp contrast, a local real estate developer engaged 
in controversial negotiations with a city council had been found by 
the Warren Court to be a public figure. 389 Clearly, times had 
changed.) 
Finally, the majority in Gertz did recognize some limited con­
stitutional protection for the media even in private figure plaintiff 
cases. While the states need not apply the Sullivan actual malice 
test in such cases, they may not impose liability on the media for 
defamation without some showing of fault. Before liability is estab­
lished, the states, at a minimum, must require a showing that the 
media defendant has been negligent. 390 As a result, the states have 
387. Id. at 351. 
388. Id. One author believes that Gertz would have been considered a public 
figure under pre-Gertz decisions because he had authored four books, thousands of 
articles, had been the subject of over 40 articles in Chicago papers, and had made 
many television and radio appearances. Robertson, Defamation and the First 
Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 222 
(1976) (footnotes omitted). 
389. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). Although 
the plaintiff in Greenbelt was also a state legislator who represented a neighboring 
county, the allegedly libelous statement about him did not involve his performance 
in public office. 
390. 418 U.S. at 347-48. The majority also declared, however, that states may 
not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages when liability is not based on 
at least a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 
349. It has been consistently held, however, that, when actual malice has been 
shown by a private figure plaintiff, he may recover punitive damages. See Maheu v. 
Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, 
Inc., 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Buckley 
v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Davis 
v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This appears to be true even if the forum 
state does not require a showing of actual malice to establish liability. 
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imposed widely varying standards of fault in defamation cases be­
tween private individual plaintiffs and media defendants. The 
standard of liability ranges from negligence, 391 to gross negli­
gence,392 to malice,393 and to some form of actual malice. 394 
Justice Powell wrote, and Justice Rehnquist adopted, the 
Gertz majority opinion. The other two Nixon appointees, who 
had formed two-thirds of the plurality in Rosenbloom, abruptly 
switched their positions in Gertz. Justice Blackmun, in a separate 
concurring opinion, announced that, had his vote not been needed 
to create a majority in Gertz, he would have adhered to his view in 
Rosenbloom. Believing that the Court's sharp divisions in 
Rosenbloom had left too much uncertainty and that a definitive rul­
ing was paramount, he abandoned Rosenbloom and joined the 
Gertz majority. 395 
Chief Justice Burger went even further. Although he had sub­
scribed to the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom that the actual mal­
ice test should be applied to all publications involving matters of 
public or general concern regardless of the plaintiff's status, he dis­
sented in Gertz and announced that he would have reinstated a 
jury verdict based on a libel per se instruction. 396 The Chief Just­
391. E.g., Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216 
(1977); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 
(1975); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976). One court in 
Connecticut found that Gertz permitted a return to state law as it existed prior to 
Rosenbloom in private figure cases. The court seemingly adopted a negligence 
standard, but the issue is not settled in that state. See Corbett v. Register Publishing 
Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d 472 (Super. Ct. 1975). 
392. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 
569,379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975). 
393. Direct Import Buyers Ass'n v. KSL, Inc., 538 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1975) de­
fined malice as simply an improper motive such as a desire to do harm or that the 
defendant did not honestly believe his statements to be true or that the publication 
was excessive. Id. at 1042. 
394. E.g., Patten v. Smith, 360 N.E.2d 233 (1977); LeBoeuf v. Times Picayune 
Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. 
Burke, 216 Va. 800, 224 S.E.2d 132 (1976). While Colorado has adopted an actual 
malice standard requiring a showing that the defendant knew his statement was false 
or published with reckless disregard for the truth, Colorado's requirement in private 
figure cases is not the same as that set forth in Sullivan and its progeny. Reckless 
disregard in Colorado means only acting "wantonly, with indifference to conse­
quences." Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. App. 86,99 n.2, 538 P.2d 
450, 457 (1975). In adopting this standard, the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly re­
jected the "serious doubts as to the truth of his publication" definition of reckless 
disregard applicable to public official and public figure cases. St. Amant v. 
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); see note 6 supra. 
395. 418 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
396. [d. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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ice rejected a negligence standard in private figure cases as being 
too vague and without guiding precedent. He urged instead that 
the law be allowed to continue to evolve as it had up to that point 
with respect to private citizens. 397 
While Gertz is generally viewed as significant because of its 
rejection of Rosenbloom and its imposition of a fault standard for 
private figure plaintiffs, the decision is also important because it 
narrowed the definition of public figure for purposes of requiring a 
showing of actual malice. One commentator rightly concluded that 
Gertz contracted the class of public figures and signaled a narrow­
ing of the public figure category.398 Gertz continued to recognize 
the two major characteristics of public figures identified in Curtis 
v. Butts399 and its companion case, Associated Press v. Walker: 40o 
public figures ordinarily can gain access to communications media 
in order to rebut defamatory charges, and they have voluntarily ex­
posed themselves in a meaningful sense to an enhanced risk of def­
amation. Gertz, however, differed in its application of these criteria 
to the facts. 401 The clear implication of Gertz is that the plaintiff 
will not incur public figure status without voluntarily seeking pub­
licity 402 with respect to the subject matter of the purportedly libel­
ous article403 unless his name is already a household word. 
The descent begun in Gertz accelerated two years later with 
Time, Inc. v. Firestone. 404 Time magazine reported that Russell 
Firestone had obtained a divorce from his wife on grounds of adul­
tery. The divorce court's record was confused, but it appeared that 
the actual ground for the divorce decree was lack of domestication. 
Mrs. Firestone brought and won a libel suit against Time, Inc. Al­
though she clearly had access to the communications media and 
had voluntarily opened herself to publicity in a meaningful 
397. Id. 
398. Robertson, supra note 388, at 221, 222. 
399. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
400. Id. 
401. Robertson, supra note 388, at 221-22. See note 378 supra and accompa­
nying text. 
402. Robertson, supra note 388, at 222-23. 
403. While Gertz purported to recognize the possibility that involuntary in­
volvement in a matter of public or general concern may make a plaintiff a public fig­
ure, it clearly left the door open only a crack. Hypothetically, it may be possible for 
someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the 
instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. 418 U.S. at 
345. . 
404. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
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sense,405 the Burger Court found that she was not a public figure 
and had to shoulder the burden of proving only negligence. 406 It 
reached this conclusion by adding a new wrinkle to the general 
analysis: access to the media and voluntary exposure to publicity 
make a plaintiff a public figure only if the subject matter of the ar­
ticle is a genuine public controversy. Dissolution of a marriage was 
found to be beyond the purview of public controversy as referred 
to in Gertz, even though some members of the reading public 
would be interested in the topic. 407 Thus, a new threshold ques­
tion was added, and Rosenbloom was not only in disgrace but 
turned on its head. Under Firestone, if a matter was not of legiti­
mate public interest according to the Court's standards, the actual 
malice test would not be applicable, regardless of the plaintiff's sta­
tuS. 408 
The latest, though probably not the final, blows to the applica­
bility of the actual malice test came in 1979 with Wolston v. Read­
er's Digest Association409 and Hutchinson v. Proxmire. 410 Wolston 
concerned a book published in 1974 which asserted that the plain­
tiff was among a group of persons convicted of espionage, falsifying 
information, perjury, contempt charges following espionage indict­
405. Mary Firestone sought publicity and engaged in activities that attracted 
the attention of the public. With her husband a member of America's wealthier in­
dustrial families, she was prominent among the "400" of Palm Beach society, and an 
active member of the "sporting set." Moreover, she did not shy away from publicity 
and even subscribed to a press clipping service. The Firestones' marital difficulties 
were known and their divorce suit became a cause celebre in social circles across the 
country. The divorce trial lasted 17 months, attracted national news coverage and 
fostered numerous articles in the Miami and Palm Beach newspapers. During the 
course of these proceedings, Mary Firestone held several press conferences. Note, 
Public Figures, Private Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN. L. REv. 157, 172 (1977) 
(footnotes omitted). See notes 401-02 supra and accompanying text. 
406. Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion, adopted by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Blackmun. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, filed a con­
curring opinion that did not discuss the public figure issue. Justices Brennan, White 
and Marshall dissented. The newly appointed Justice Stevens did not take part in 
the decision. 
407. 424 U.S. at 454. 
408. The majority tried to portray Mrs. Firestone as a private figure in any 
event, arguing that she was compelled to go to court to seek a divorce so her in­
volvement was not voluntary. Id. Moreover, her few press conferences did not make 
her a public figure because they could not have been calculated to affect the out­
come of the matter in controversy, the divorce proceedings. Id. at n.3. The Court's 
analysis is unsatisfying, however, ignoring as it does the totality of Mrs. Firestone's 
public activities. 
409. 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979). 
410. 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979). 
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ments or of fleeing to the Soviet bloc to avoid prosecution. 411 Al­
though the plaintiff had been convicted of contempt of court in 
1958 for failing to appear before a grand jury investigating Soviet 
espionage, he had never been indicted for any of the other listed 
offenses. 
Finding the plaintiff a public figure412 who had failed to estab­
lish the publisher's actual malice, the district court granted, and 
the court of appeals affirmed, summary judgment for the defen­
dant. In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Burger Court 
reversed, concluding that the plaintiff was a private figure so that a 
lesser standard of liability than actual malice was required. 413 
At least three significant points in the Court's analysis led to 
this conclusion. First, the Court explicitly rejected the contention 
"that any person who engages in criminal conduct automatically be­
comes a public figure for purposes of comment on a limited range 
of issues relating to his conviction. "414 While perhaps surprising to 
some that this Court would so solicitously treat the rights of crimi­
nals in preference to the rights of others, and while an argument 
can be constructed that persons who engage in certain types of 
criminal conduct have voluntarily thrust themselves into a matter 
of legitimate public concern, this determination is at least easily 
understood and applied. Moreover, it probably does not present a 
tremendous problem to those who may wish to publish articles 
about highly visible criminal figures engaged in illegal activity of 
wide public interest. Presumably, there is more about them than 
their convictions that makes them public figures. 
What is disturbing, however, is the reasoning used to justify 
this decision. Plaintiff Wolston, the majority found, did not seek 
public attention to influence the resolution of the issues involved, 
nor were his activities calculated to draw attention to himself in or­
411. 99 S. Ct. at 2703. 
412. The district court concluded that the plaintiff, by failing to appear before 
the grand jury and subjecting himself to a citation for contempt, became involved in 
a public controversy that invited attention and comment, and created in the public 
an interest in his connection with espionage. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. 
Supp. 167, 177 n.33 (D.D.C.), aII'd, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2701 
(1979). The court of appeals found that, by refusing to comply with the subpoena, 
the plaintiff "stepped center front into the spotlight focused on the investigation of 
Soviet espionage." 578 F.2d at 431. In short, by his voluntary action he invited atten­
tion and comment in connection with the public questions involved in the investiga­
tion of espionage. Id. 
413. 99 S. Ct. at 2704. 
414. Id. at 2708. "To hold otherwise would create an 'open season' for all who 
sought to defame persons convicted of a crime." Id. at 2708-09. 
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der to invite public comment. In short, the majority found no basis 
whatsoever for concluding that Wolston had relinquished his inter­
est in protecting his own name. 415 One wonders how many persons 
engaged in criminal -activity conduct themselves so as to draw at­
tention to themselves or to influence the public. 416 The message to 
reporters investigating persons allegedly connected with organized 
crime appears to be that, despite the high degree of public concern 
with such matters, the subjects of investigation are private figures; 
therefore, the actual malice standard will be unavailable should the 
reporter err. If Gertz endangered the involuntary public figure 
species,417 the reasoning, if not the holding, of Wolston appears to 
have rendered it extinct. 418 
The second significant point of the Wolston decision is its 
treatment of what constitutes a matter of public controversy, an 
important question since Firestone. 419 In a footnote to his 
discussion of the involuntary nature of Wolston's involvement in 
the investigation of Soviet espionage in the United States, Justice 
Rehnquist offered this analysis: 
It is difficult to determine with precISIon the "public con­
troversy" into which ... [Wolston] is alleged to have thrust 
himself. Certainly, there was no controversy or debate in 1958 
about the desirability of permitting Soviet espionage in the 
415. Id. at 2708. Wolston's failure to appear before the grand jury was appar­
ently due to poor health. The opinion suggests that, had Wolston invited a citation 
for contempt with the intention of using it to create public discussion about the in­
vestigation, it might have been a different case. Id. 
416. See Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga.), 
aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff, identified in the defendant's article 
as a "California mobster" with underworld ties, argued that he was a private figure 
because he had not thrust himself voluntarily into the vortex of any public issue. Al­
though the plaintiff had never been convicted of any crime, he admitted that he was 
personally acquainted with many of the persons identified by the staff at a United 
States Senate Committee investigating organized crime, as members of the under­
world. He had also been the subject of governmental investigations and criminal 
prosecutions. He had been mentioned in over 40 articles relating to alleged under­
world contacts and involvements. The court concluded that the plaintiff had "volun­
tarily engaged in a course that was bound to invite attention and comment" and was 
therefore a public figure. Id. at 445. 
417. See note 403 supra and accompanying text. 
418. In the view of Justices Blackmun and Brennan, the Court seemingly held 
that "a person becomes a limited-issue public figure only if he literally or figura­
tively 'mounts a rostrum' to advocate a particular view," a definition of "public fig­
ure" they believed to be unnecessarily "restrictive." 99 S. Ct. at 2709 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
419. See note 407 supra and accompanying text. 
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United States; all responsible United States citizens understand­
ably were and are opposed to it.420 
The implications of pennitting any court to decide that there 
can be no controversy because no "responsible" citizen could take 
a particular view are enormous. Had Walston been handed down 
in 1965, one can easily envision a lower court picking up on Justice 
Rehnquist's language and detennining that there was no contro­
versy over the Vietnam War because no "responsible" citizen could 
oppose the decision of his President to commit United States 
troops to the fight against communism. Moreover, Justice Rehn­
quist's broad definition of the controversy involved in Walston in­
vites absurd results. One court could detennine that SALT II is 
not a matter of controversy because there can be no debate about 
the undesirability of a nuclear holocaust. Another court could rea­
son that SALT II is uncontroversial because there can be no debate 
about the desirability of keeping a strong deterrent to Soviet mili­
tary might. 
Third, the Court declined to decide the issue of whether the 
passage of time may convert a public figure into a private figure. 
Because the issue was not pursued in Walston and because the ma­
jority concluded that he was not a public figure even in 1958, the 
Court did not decide "whether or when an individual who was 
once a public figure may lose that status by the passage of 
time. "421 The Justices, filing separate opinions, however, did ex­
press themselves on the question. In dissent, Justice Brennan ar­
gued that Wolston qualified as a public figure "for the limited pur­
pose of comment on his connection with, or involvement in, 
espionage in the 1940's and 1950'S"422 and that mere lapse of time 
was not decisive of his status. 423 Justice Blackmun, joined by Just­
ice Marshall in a concurring opinion, argued that the lapse sixteen 
years rendered consideration of Wolston's original public figure sta­
tus unnecessary.424 Any argument that Wolston had assumed the 
420. 99 S. Ct. at 2707 n.8. The majority was willing to accept, arguendo, the 
publisher's characterization of the public controversy as involving the propriety of 
the law enforcement officials' conduct in investigating and prosecuting suspected So­
viet agents because it was clear that Wolston failed to meet the Gertz public figure 
criteria. The majority did not think much of this definition of the controversy in­
volved. Justice Brennan,in dissent, adopted the court of appeals' view that the is­
sues of national security and Wolston's involvement in espionage were legitimate 
topics of debate in 1958 and remain vital today. Id. at 2710. 
421. Id. at 2707 n.7. 
422. Id. at 2710 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Wolston v. Reader's Digest 
Ass'n, 578 F.2d at 431). 
423. Id. 
424. Id. at 2709 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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risk of public scrutiny was negated by his deliberate efforts to re­
gain anonymity during the sixteen years intervening between his 
conviction and publication. 425 Quite obviously, the passage of time 
issue remains unresolved. 
Finally, there is Hutchinson v. Proxmire,426 a case that did not 
involve a media defendant but that nonetheless further restricted 
the !fleaning of public figure in media defamation cases. 427 
Hutchinson was a recipient of grants from the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) and the Navy for his work as a 
research behavioral scientist. The grants Hutchinson had received 
to study aggressive behavior patterns of certain animals approached 
half a million dollars. NASA and the Office of Naval Research re­
ceived one of Senator William Proxmire's "Golden Fleece of the 
Month" awards, made by the Senator to publicize what he viewed 
to be examples of grossly wasteful government spending. Various 
communications by the Senator and members of his staff concern­
ing this particular award included disparaging comments about 
Hutchinson's work and its value. As a result, Hutchinson sued 
Proxmire for defamation. 428 Both the United States District Court 
in Wisconsin429 and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit430 had ruled, inter alia, that Hutchinson was a 
public figure,431 that the Sullivan test, therefore, applied, and that 
Hutchinson had not proven actual malice. 
The Burger Court's decision in Hutchinson sent new shivers 
425. Id. As a result of this analysis one might be considered a public figure. 
during contemporaneous reporting of an event, yet not be a public figure for pur­
poses of later historical commentary on the same occurrence. Justice Blackmun did 
not object to subjecting historians to greater liability for a defamation because histo­
rians work under different conditions than their media counterparts. Id. at 2709-10. 
Cf. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977) (the sons of Ethel and Julius 
Rosenberg were held to be public figures for purposes of a defamation action con­
cerning a book published 20 years after their parents' executions there being no sug­
gestion that the passage of those 20 years may have made any difference to the plain­
tiffs' status). 
426. 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979). 
427. The Supreme Court has never decided whether the Sullivan standard 
applies to cases involving non-media defendants. Its conclusion that the plaintiff in 
Hutchinson was neither a public official nor a public figure made it unnecessary to 
decide that question. Id. at 2687 n.16. 
428. Id. at 2677-78.. 
429. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311 (w.n. Wis. 1977), afi'd, 579 
F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. III (1979). 
430. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 111 
(1979). 
431. The district court also found Hutchinson to be a public official. 431 F. 
Supp. at 1327-28. The court of appeals did not decide that issue. 
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down the spines of media lawyers for at least two reasons. First, al­

though not called upon to discuss it, the majority said that it felt 

constrained to cast some doubt on the notion that summary judg­
. ments in favor of defamation defendants ought to be the rule, 

rather than the exception, in public figure and public official cases 

where actual malice has not been shown. Because proof of actual 

malice calls into question the defendant's state of mind, the major­

ity reasoned, it does not readily lend itself to summary disposi­

tion. 432 
Second, Hutchinson radically contracted the public figure cate­
gory and cast new doubt on the scope of the public official class. At 
the time of the award, Hutchinson was director of research at the 
Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital, operated by the Michigan State 
Department of Mental Health. During most of the time of his re­
search, he was also an adjunct professor at Western Michigan Uni­
versity. Over a seven year period, while in these and other public 
employment positions, Hutchinson applied for and received 
$500,000 in grants from the federal government. 433 
The proper expenditure of government funds is a matter of 
public concern, which has become more pronounced in recent 
years. 434 Nevertheless, eight Supreme Court Justices agreed435 
432. 99 S. Ct. at 2680 n.9. The majority quickly noted, however, that the pos­
ture of the case did not require concern with the propriety of dealing with such com­
plex issues by summary judgment. ld. 
Nevertheless, the footnote has had its apparently intended effect. In Nader v. de 
Toledano, 5 MED. L. RPTR. 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1979), for example, the District of Co­
lumbia Circuit recognized the emphaSis placed by courts and commentators on the 
utility of summary judgment in First Amendment libel cases to avoid harassment of 
the press and promote free speech by doing away with vexatious defamation claims 
by public figures before they become unnecessarily costly to the defendant. 
Nonetheless, the circuit court overturned a summary judgment granted a newspaper 
columnist against a public figure plaintiff, quoting the infamous footnote nine and re­
marking that the Supreme Court had recently sounded a note of caution in the area 
of summary judgments. Id. at 1558. 
Similarly, in Church of Scientology v. Siegelman, 5 MED. L. RPTR. 2021 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), summary judgment was denied a media defendant whose defense 
was that the statements he made concerning a public figure plaintiff were made 
without actual malice. The court, again citing footnote nine, ruled that the actual 
malice defense could not be decided at the time because footnote nine had cast 
doubt on the propriety of granting summary judgment where actual malice had been 
alleged. The court, still left open the possibility of a future summary judgment 
motion following additional, though unspecified, discovery. ld. at 2024, 2025. 
433. 99 S. Ct. at 2678. 
434. Expenditure of public funds is not a controversy if one follows Justice 
Rehnquist's reasoning in Walston and concludes that there is no controversy here 
because all responsible citizens oppose government waste. That is precisely what 
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with Chief Justice Burger's opinion that Hutchinson was not a pub­
lie figure. The majority opinion, noting that the court of appeals 
had not determined Hutchinson's status as a public official, ex­
pressed no opinion. It expressed the view that the category of pub­
lic officials cannot be thought to include all public employees. 436 
The Court, in 1966, said that the public official designation applies 
at the very least to those who have, or appear to the public to 
have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of 
governmental affairs.437 The term "public official" has been said to 
include those public employees whose positions are so important 
that the public has an independent interest in the office holders' 
qualifications and performance. 438 These definitions guided lower 
court opinions for thirteen years. 
By finding that a director of research at a state mental hospital 
who was also an adjunct professor at a state university is not a pub­
lic official for purposes of application of the Sullivan standard, the 
Court has brought into serious question the vitality of numerous 
cases finding school teachers, school principals, police officers and 
other public employees to be public officials for libel purposes. 439 
The breadth of the term public official has been greatly contracted 
by Hutchinson, further limiting the application of the Sullivan 
standard. Uncertainty in the newsroom has correspondingly in­
creased. 
In addition, the Hutchinson opinion continued to erode the in­
voluntary public figure concept, already diminished by Wolston. 
The district court's and court of appeals' conclusion that 
Hutchinson was a public figure was premised on two grounds: 
Hutchinson's successful application for federal grants had been re­
ported in local newspapers; and he had access to the media, as 
witnessed by publication of his response to the Golden Fleece 
award. 440 The Supreme Court was unimpressed with either 
the Court did, if Hutchinson were a public figure, everyone receiving one of the 
myriad public grants would be classified as such. [d. at 2688. 
435. Although Justice Brennan dissented from the result, he did not do so on 
the basis of the public figure issue. His view was that Proxmire was shielded from li­
ability by the speech or debate clause. [d. at 2689. Justice stewart joined the majority 
opinion 'in its entirety excepting only a footnote dealing with the application of 
speech or debate clause immunity to communications between members of Congress 
and federal agencies. [d. at 2688-89 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
436. [d. at 2680 n.8. 
437. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75,85 (1966). 
438. [d. at 86. 
439. See notes 367-374 supra and accompanying text. 
440. 99 S. Ct. at 2688. 
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ground. The Court pointed out that Hutchinson's published writ­
ings reached a relatively small category of professionals concerned 
with research in human behavior and did not become a matter of 
controversy until Senator Proxmire brought them to the public's at­
tention through his announcement of the Golden Fleece award. 
Hutchinson's alleged defamers, the Court reasoned, could not cre­
ate a defense for themselves by making Hutchinson into a public 
figure. 441 Second, the Court held that Hutchinson had not thrust 
himself into a public controversy because no controversy existed. 
He reasoned that almost every member of the general public was 
concerned about government spending. 442 Neither Hutchinson's 
applications for federal grants nor his publications in professional 
journals invited sufficient public attention and comment to trans­
form him into a public figure. 443 No one dissented from the con­
clusion that Hutchinson was not a public figure and that the consti­
tutional protection afforded by the Sullivan standard did not apply. 
It bears repeating that the Sullivan standard was devised to as­
sure that debate on public issues be "uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open. "444 Constitutional protection of even erroneous state­
ments made in the context of such debate is necessary in order to 
guarantee that freedoms of expression have the "breathing space" 
they need to survive.445 To suggest, as Hutchinson does, that com­
ment about the performance of public officials in their official 
capacities merits the strongest available constitutional protection, 
yet comment about the expenditure of public funds does not war­
rant r'such protection, creates a curious line of demarcation. If any­
thing stirs the blood of the American public more than malfeasance 
in public office, it is the waste of taxpayers' dollars. Surely the wis­
dom of any governmental expenditure must be the subject of 
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate. 446 It is no answer 
that discussions of particular expenditures are not controversies be­
cause everyone opposes waste. The subject of debate is whether 
the particular expenditure is wasteful, not whether waste is unde­
sirable. 
A plurality of the Supreme Court became convinced, after 
441. ld. 
442. See note 434 supra and accompanying text. 
443. 99 S. Ct. at 2688. 
444. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. 
445. ld. at 271-72. 
446. ld. at 270. 
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only four years of experience with the public figure category, that 
focus on the plaintiff's status bore little relation to the values pro­
tected by the First Amendment. The distinction that public figures 
have voluntarily exposed themselves to public inspection while pri­
vate individuals have kept their lives hidden from view was re­
jected as a legal fiction. 447 The three Justices making up the 
Rosenbloom plurality determined that the Sullivan standard should 
be extended to all matters of public or general concern without re­
gard to the eminency or anonymity of the persons involved. 448 
Although a majority of the Court has rejected the plurality 
opinion in Rosenbloom on repeated occasions,449 and two of the 
three Justices making up the Rosenbloom plurality have switched 
their positions,450 the propriety of the Rosenbloom approach is 
made abundantly clear by the result reached in Hutchinson. 
Wrestling with the ponderous question of whether Hutchinson in­
vited sufficient attention to his applications for federal grants to 
warrant imposition of an actual malice standard of liability for state­
ments made about him is misdirected. Instead, the Court should 
follow the Rosenbloom plurality and focus on the values the First 
Amendment is designed to protect. Since discussion of public ex­
penditures goes to the heart of those values, Dr. Hutchinson 
should not complain if comments about his use of federal money 
are given the highest constitutional protection. It seems just as fair 
to expect recipients of federal grants to assume the risk of public 
debate as it is to expect public officials to incur such risk. 
A return to the Rosenbloom standard would represent a re­
vival of rationality. What constitutes a matter of general interest or 
concern needs to be refined first, to provide certainty as to which 
matters should receive maximum constitutional protection. The 
Court may wish to establish a line between "concerns" and "con­
troversies" to protect the Mrs. Firestones of the world to some de­
gree. It may well be that discussion of a wealthy couple's marital 
problems does not require the same protection as do discussions of 
official malfeasance or public expenditures. But if "controversy" is 
to be the standard, the Court will have to do better in defining it 
than it has in Wolston and Hutchinson. 
447. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. at 47,48. 
448. Id. at 44. 
449. E.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. at 2708; Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 346. 
450. See notes 395 & 396 supra and accompanying text. 
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VI. INVASIONS OF PRIVACY 
Since Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren crafted the 
tort ninety years ago,451 invasion of privacy has become a burgeon­
ing field, to the alarm of media lawyers. 452 Privacy law has grown 
from its humble beginnings to encompass at least four widely di­
vergent subcategories: Appropriation of likeness,453 publication of 
private facts,454 intrusion455 and false light. 456 A fifth category, the 
proprietary right of publicity, is now developing as a spin-off from 
appropriation of likeness. 457 Despite the expansion of the invasion 
of privacy tort, the United States Supreme Court has had few occa­
sions to analyze the nature and scope of the tort and its various cat­
egories. 
451. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
452. See, e.g., Abrams, The Press, Privacy and the Constitution, N.Y. Times 
Magazine, Aug. 21, 1977, at 11; Schwartz, Danger: Pendulum Swinging, 239 THE 
ATLANTIC 29 (1977). 
453. One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the likeness or name of 
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Friedan v. 
Friedan, 414 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (use of photograph to promote magazine 
sales); Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48 App. Div. 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975), afi'd, 
39 N.Y.2d 897, 352 N.E.2d 584, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976) (use of photograph to pro­
mote subscriptions). 
454. One who gives publicity to matters concerning the private life of another, 
of a kind highly offensive to a reasonable man, is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) 
(description of former celebrity's current private life in "Where Are They Now?" fea­
ture); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964) (news 
photograph revealing plaintiff's undergarments); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 
Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971) (description of reformed ex­
convict's eleven year old crime). 
455. One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude 
or seclusion of another, or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of his privacy if the intrusion would be highly offensive to the rea­
sonable man. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (harassment 
by photographer); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (entry by 
journalists into private office under false pretenses); LeMistrol, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting Sys., 61 App. Div. 2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978) (uninvited entry of 
restaurant by television reporter and camera crew). 
456. One who gives to another publicity that places the other before the public 
in a false light of a kind highly offensive to a reasonable man is subject to liability to 
the other for invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Wilson, 2 MED. L. RPTR. 2008, 
2010 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (unauthorized biography containing "false and fabricated" 
facts); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (false state­
ment that plaintiff signed political nomination petition). False light privacy differs 
from defamation in that, in the former, proof of harm to plaintiff's reputation is not 
required. 
457. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
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A. "False Light" Privacy 
The principal Supreme Court privacy OpInIOn preceding the 
Burger Court decisions was a false light privacy case, Time, Inc. v. 
Hill. 458 In Hill, the Warren Court purported to hold that the con­
stitutional protections afforded to the media in defamation cases ex­
tended to false light privacy actions as well. Hill temporarily 
pushed the media's protection in false light privacy cases ahead of 
the protection available in defamation cases because it anticipated 
the later plurality opinion in Rosenbloom. 459 In Hill, the Court 
held that, absent proof of actual malice, the First Amendment pre­
cluded redress of false reports of matters of public interest, regard­
less of the plaintiff's status as a public or private figure. 460 
Because the Rosenbloom standard has been repudiated in def­
amation cases and the Burger Court has held that only public offi­
cial and public figure libel plaintiffs need prove actual malice,461 
the continuing vitality of Hill in private figure plaintiff false light 
cases is in some doubt. When presented with the opportunity to 
do to Hill what it had done to Rosenbloom, however, the Burger 
Court declined to do so. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co. ,462 
decided after Gertz, involved a false light privacy action by a 
mother and son whose husband and father, respectively, had been 
killed in a bridge collapse. By almost any standard, and certainly 
by the Gertz standard, the plaintiffs in Cantrell were private fig­
ures. The article which the defendants published about the impact 
of the death on the plaintiffs' lives contained several admitted inac­
curacies and false statements about the plaintiffs. An Ohio jury, 
after receiving an actual malice instruction,463 awarded the plain­
tiffs damages under a false light theory. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed on the ground that the evi­
dence was insufficient to support a finding of actual malice. 464 
The Burger Court, had it been so inclined, could have used 
Cantrell as the vehicle to announce that proof of actual malice was 
458. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
459. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
460. 385 U.S. at 387-88. Actual malice is defined as knowledge of falsity or 
reckless disregard of the truth. 
461. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 334; see notes 485-488 infra and 
accompanying text. 
462. 419 U.S. 245 (1974). 
463. Id. at 250 n.3. 
464. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 484 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 
419 U.S. 245 (1974). 
674 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:593 
not required of private false light privacy plaintiffs even in cases 
involving matters of public interest. Instead, it noted that no one 
had objected to the trial court's actual malice instruction465 and 
found no prejudice, even assuming error in the instruction. The 
Court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's decision of insufficient ac­
tual malice evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. 466 It reinstated 
the verdict, and the plaintiffs prevailed even under a standard that 
may have been too high. The Court declined to decide whether 
the Hill actual malice standard, or a more relaxed standard, applied 
in false light cases between media defendants and private individ­
uals. 467 
Considering the Burger Court's refinements of the constitu­
tional privilege in defamation cases, it is probable that the Court 
would have seized the opportunity to do away with the actual mal­
ice standard for private figure false light plaintiffs had the Cantrell 
jury found for the defendant under its actual malice instruction. 
The Court's admirable restraint leaves some hope for the media. 
Even if the Rosenbloom standard468 is never revitalized in defama­
tion cases, several reasons exist for requiring a higher standard of 
proof in false light privacy cases than in defamation cases. 
First, the injuries redressed by the two torts are quite differ­
ent. By definition, defamation assails a plaintiff's reputation and 
arouses "'hatred, contempt, scorn, obloquy or shame,' and the 
like."469 False light invasions of privacy, on the other hand, focus 
not on the impact of the publication on the plaintiff's reputation 
but on the plaintiffs internal reactions to it.470 Second, it is proba­
bly easier for a journalist developing a story to recognize a poten­
tially defamatory statement than one that would cause his subject 
465. 419 U.S. at 250. This should not have been surprising since the trial was 
held before Gertz was announced and the Rosenbloom plurality opinion was still ac­
ceptable even in defamation cases. 
466. ld. at 252-55. 
467. ld. at 250; cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (the states 
are not bound by the actual malice test but may define for themselves the appropri­
ate standard of liability for defamation of private individuals). 
468. See text accompanying notes 383 & 385 supra. 
469. Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1945). 
470. For example, the focus of the Cantrell false light case was on the outrage, 
shame, mental distress and humiliation suffered by the family. 419 U.S. at 248. In 
distinguishing false light invasion of privacy cases from right of publicity cases, how­
ever, the Court has said that the interest protected in the former is clearly that of 
reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation. Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1978). But if the interests to be 
protected are the same, one must wonder why separate torts are recognized. 
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to suffer inward humiliation. The Warren Court acknowledged this 
in Hill. Requiring certainty about nondefamatory facts, the Court 
contended, would saddle the press with an impossible burden and 
would seriously impair our free press because the words carry no 
warning that they are potentially harmfu1.471 The Warren Court 
thus stressed in Hill that the actual malice test was being applied 
to false light privacy cases upon consideration of the factors 
comprising such privacy cases, not through blind adherence to 
Sullivan. 472 
B. Publication of Matters of Public Record 
The Burger Court's second major privacy decision, in Cox, 473 
involved an entirely different question. Cox concerned the disclo­
sure of private facts during a telecast in which the identity of a 
rape and murder victim, the plaintiff's daughter, was published. 
The plaintiff sued the television station for invasion of privacy un­
der a Georgia statute474 which makes it a misdemeanor to publish 
or broadcast the name of a rape victim. The station's reporter had 
learned the victim's identity by examining indictments of the al­
leged assailants made available for his inspection in the courtroom 
during preliminary hearings on the case. 475 There was no dispute 
that the victim's identity appeared in the indictments or that the 
indictments were public records available for inspections.476 
The Court did not use Cox as a forum for deciding a question 
left open by Hill, that is, whether truthful publication of private 
matters unrelated to public affairs could be constitutionally pro­
scribed. 477 Instead, it viewed Cox as presenting the much nar­
rower question of whether a state could impose sanctions on the 
accurate reporting of the name of a rape victim which was a matter 
of public record. 478 The Court concluded that the state may not 
impose such sanctions. It appeared to extend the Cox decision to 
public records in general, stating that publication of public records 
471. 385 u.s. at 389. 
472. [d. at 390. 
473. 420 U.S. at 469. 
474. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972). 
475. The hearings took place some eight months after the crime. Despite exten­
sive press coverage of the crime the identity of the victim had not been disclosed 
pending trial. 420 U.S. at 471. 
476. [d. at 472-73. 
477. [d. at 491. 
478. [d. 
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cannot be forbidden because the subject's sensibilities might be of­
fended. 479 
The Court premised its decision on two basic factors. First, 
the state must have determined that the public interest was being 
served by placing the information in the public domain. 48o Second, 
individual citizens must necessarily rely upon the press to bring to 
them in convenient form the facts of the operations of govern­
ment. 481 The Court summarized that freedom of the press to pub­
lish information contained in public records is of critical importance 
to our type of government in which the citizenry judges the propri­
ety of the conduct of public business. 482 
The issue not addressed in Cox was the entitlement of the me­
dia to access to public records. The Cox majority hinted, however, 
that states wishing to protect privacy interests in judicial proceed­
ings may do so by avoiding public documentation of private infor­
mation. 483 The Court, though, expressly disclaimed any implication 
that it had considered the constitutional questions behind state pol­
icies prohibiting access by the public and press to various kinds of 
official records. 484 The Cox decision was by its terms limited to 
cases in which the state had placed the disputed information in the 
public domain. Since Cox, the Burger Court has held that the pub­
lic's right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute, that 
the press has no right to information about a trial superior to that 
of the public, and that custodians of judicial records may exercise 
an "informed discretion" in deciding which records to release to 
the public. 485 
Cox did raise an additional, unanticipated issue. In discussing 
the tort of invasion of privacy, Justice White, writing for the major­
ity, said that the Court had left open the question of whether the 
Constitution mandates that truth be recognized as a defense in a 
defamation action brought by a private person. 486 Justice Powell, 
concurring in the Cox result, felt that the Gertz requirement of 
479. Id. at 495-96. 
480. Id. at 495. 
481. Id. at 491. 
482. Id. at 495. 
483. Id. at 496. 
484. Id. at 496 n.26. 
485. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 603 (1978) (White 
House tapes in court custody). Cox was found to be inapplicable because the records 
sought by the media in Nixon were not available to the general public. Id. at 608. 
486. 420 U.S. at 490. 
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fault in private figure plaintiff cases was dispositive of the issue 
since the standard could not be satisfied unless the statements 
were false. 487 Truth, therefore, could be a defense. Justice Powell's 
logic seems impeccable, but further developments from the Court 
are required to determine if a real issue exists as to whether truth 
can be a defense. 488 
C. The Proprietary Right of Publicity 
Ironically, the subspecies of the right of privacy receiving the 
closest examination by the Supreme Court is the one most recently 
developed, the proprietary right of publicity. While most commen­
tators tend to class an invasion of the right of publicity as a form of 
misappropriation,489 the two are not necessarily synonymous. 
The classic misappropriation case is Roberson v. Rochester 
Folding Box Co. ,490 which involved the use of the plaintiffs like­
ness on flour boxes and advertisements. The plaintiff was simply a 
very pretty girl whose pleasing looks, the defendants evidently 
thought, would help sell the flour poxes on which her face ap­
peared. She was not a famous persot., and there was no commer­
cial value in implying that she endorsed the product. The plaintiff 
sued because she felt humiliated and distressed. Though she lost 
the suit because the New York Court of Appeals in 1902 was un­
willing to recognize the tort of invasion of privacy, the decision led 
to the enactment of a statute prohibiting the unauthorized use of a 
person's likeness or name "for advertising purposes, or for the pur­
poses of trade."491 Thus, the tort of invasion of privacy by misap­
propriation was born in New York. 
Roberson involved a private plaintiff humiliated by having her 
picture plastered over flour boxes and posters. Invasion of the pro­
prietary right of publicity involves something a little different. 
While triggered by the unauthorized use of a person's name or 
likeness, right of publicity plaintiffs are not private persons who 
487. Id. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring). 
488. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result without opinion. Justice 
Douglas concurred, saying the government has no power to suppress "news of the 
day." Id. at SOl. Justice Rehnquist dissented on procedural grounds. Justice 
Rehnquist argued that, no final judgment having been appealed from, the Court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at S02-12. The majority had concluded other­
wise. Id. at 47S-87. 
489. See, e.g., J. BA~ON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND 
FREE PRESS § 7:8, at 72 (1979). 
490. 171 N.Y. S38, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). 0 
491. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ SO, SI (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1979). 
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simply want to be left alone. On the contrary, they are public fig­
ures who have exploited their names and likenesses for their own 
commercial purposes and do not want others to capitalize on their 
notoriety without paying them for the privilege. Another difference 
is that the interests protected by misappropriation generally do not 
survive the plaintiff,492 but in some jurisdictions, heirs and assign­
ees may sue to enforce the right of publicity even after the death 
of the celebrity. 493 
The Burger Court examined the right of publicity in Zacchini 
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting CO.494 The plaintiff had a fifteen 
second "human cannonball" act that was filmed by a television sta­
tion and was broadcast on the local news in the community where 
the plaintiff was performing. Suing the station for unlawful appro­
priation of professional property,495 the plaintiff complained that 
the unauthorized publication of his act damaged him commercially. 
The majority of the Ohio Supreme Court felt constitutionally con­
strained by Hill to rule against the plaintiff. The Burger Court, 
however, distinguished Hill as involving an entirely different tort 
from the right of publicity which was at issue in Zacchini. 496 
The interest protected in false light cases differs from that as­
serted in right of publicity cases. False light cases concern the 
plaintiff's mental distress, but right of publicity actions focus on the 
right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors, being 
analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law. 497 Another dis­
tinction is that false light causes of action seek to minimize the 
publication of information to the public. Right of publicity plain­
tiffs, on the contrary, do not object to widespread publication as 
long as they get the commercial benefit of such publication. 498 
The majority, in an opinion written by Justice White, saw no 
constitutional impediment to enforcing the plaintiff's right of pub­
licity, even against the news media. Justice White equated broad­
casting a performer's entire act without his consent with broad­
casting a copyrighted dramatic work without compensating the 
492. The New York Civil Rights Law, for example, is limited by its terms to the 
misappropriation of the names and likenesses of "living person(s)." Id. see Lombardo 
v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977). 
493. See, e.g., Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(assignee of Elvis Presley's "transferable property right" of publicity). 
494. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
495. Id. at 564. 
496. Id.at 57l. 
497. Id. at 573. 
498. Id. 
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owner. He found nothing in the Constitution that could prevent 
states from requiring media defendants to pay plaintiffs for 
transmitting their entire act to the public. 499 Justice Powell's dis­
sent, which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, expressed doubt 
that the language "a performer's entire . act" provided a clear 
enough standard for resolution of this case: 500 He concluded, in 
any event, that the use of the film was undeniably for news pur­
poses and, therefore, was constitutionally privileged. 
On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court decided that if the 
United States Constitution did not protect the media here, neither 
did the Ohio Constitution; and the court remanded the case for 
trial. 501 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The great expansion of press rights and privileges under the 
Warren Court has been followed by the Burger Court's constriction 
of journalists' constitutional perquisites. A clue to the reasons be­
hind the curtailment of press rights is in Chief Justice Burger's 
concurring opinion in First National Bank v. Bellotti,502 a case os­
tensibly not involving press freedoms. 
In Bellotti, a five-justice majority overturned a Massachusetts 
statute prohibiting business corporations from spending money to 
influence votes on referenda unless the issue materially affected 
the business or assets of the corporation. 503 In support of the stat­
ute, Massachusetts argued, inter alia, that it was necessary to pre­
serve the integrity of the electoral process and the individual 
citizen's confidence in government. It reasoned that without re­
strictions on spending, corporations might "drown out other points 
of view. "504 The majority rejected this argument as being 
unsupported either by the record or by the authorities. 505 
In his concurring opinion, the Chief Justice expressed concern 
that Massachusetts' argument, if taken to its logical extreme, might 
jeopardize the First Amendment rights of the mass communica­
499. Id. at 574-75. 
500. Id. at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justices Powell, 
Brennan and Marshall dissented on substantive grounds. Justice Stevens dissented 
on procedural grounds. 
501. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d 286, 376 
N.E.2d 582 (1978). 
502. 435 U.S. 765 (1979). 
503. Id. at 784. 
504. Id. at 787. 
505. Id. at 789-90. 
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tions businesses, particularly the large media conglomerates who 
do business in the corporate form. 506 This was so, he asserted, be­
cause of the difficulty of distinguishing, in fact and in law, between 
media corporations and others conducting business in the corporate 
form. The thrust of Chief Justice Burger's argument was that there 
was no distinction between the First Amendment rights of media 
corporations and those of other corporate entities. In so finding, 
the Chief Justice was simply reasserting his position in the host of 
cases in which he had declared that the press had no greater rights 
than the public to gather or to disseminate information. He has 
consistently rejected the theory that the press, under the First 
Amendment, has a special role to play in the constitutional 
scheme. 
More revealing about this particular opinion, however, is the 
Chief Justice's portrayal of the media. He referred to the "vast 
wealth and power" amassed by some media enterprises and sug­
gested that such media conglomerates pose a much more realistic 
threat than business corporations which generally are not con­
cerned with shaping popular opinion on public issues. 507 He re­
peated his finding in Tornillo that modem media empires place the 
power to shape public opinion and to influence the American peo­
ple in the hands of very few. 508 
It is entirely possible to read too much into the Bellotti opin­
ion, but it is equally possible that the Chief Justice revealed an at­
titude toward the media that has colored his view of all first 
Amendment issues to reach his Court. Whether the other Justices 
who have more or less consistently voted to restrict press rights 
share this attitude is highly conjectural. It is a question worthy of 
some study. 
The Chief Justice and a majority of his Court have clearly re­
jected the notion that the press has a special constitutional role 
which cannot be carried out without special rights and privileges. 
Government secrecy is immune from media investigations while 
press secrecy does not enjoy similar immunity from government 
probing. The media may publish what they learn, but they have no 
constitutional right to be educated. It is in this framework that 
journalists must now do their job. It can only be hoped that they 
can rise to the task. 
506. Id. at 796 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
507. Id. 
508. Id. 
